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Summary
There is little information available about the impacts of programmes for private sector development (PSD),
largely because:
■ goals are very ambitious, and impacts costly to quantify – relative to the resources available; indeed, the
cost of measuring impacts is often classified as an ‘overhead’, to be kept to a minimum; and
■ systemic change in the private sector as a whole does not lend itself to the mechanistic model of
inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts in conventional thinking; attribution and timing issues are acute.
Besides, practitioners would need to accept the methodology, and to be rewarded for good performance, for
results measurement to be adopted on a large scale. However, current indicators in common usage, such as
leverage (to be maximised) and overhead (to be minimised), encourage perverse incentives and distract from
the core task of achieving developmental goals. Furthermore, the many self-published ‘success stories’ leave
most observers confused.
In the absence of much discussion on the subject, it remains rather sensitive, and one that people therefore try
to avoid. Meanwhile, external pressures are growing, for more information; they are coming from donors (e.g.
through the Paris Declaration, the MDG deadline), new players and aid models (e.g. social investors) and
increased visibility (e.g. Live8). This Reader argues that practitioners need to seize the initiative and to develop
answers, before someone else does it for them. In the absence of good data, critics will always be able to say:
‘if you cannot measure it, maybe it is not there’.
A brief overview is therefore given of current understanding in the field, including particularly the terms,
indicators and methodologies in use. It is argued that multi-agency agreement in these areas would yield very
important benefits, in addition to an approximate comparison of performance; for example:
■ agencies could add impacts achieved across all of their country programmes, enabling them to report
results for the agency as a whole
■ agencies would also be able to make informed choices about which intervention strategies to fund
Examples are given of impacts measured in a standard format, including for example cost per job created;
since the resulting numbers are very different in magnitude, they make a rational conversation about strategy
choice possible – even if they are only correct to within +/- 50%. Agreement now needs to be built around the
key parameters for formulating these numbers, including for example the multipliers to use for indirect
impacts.
Approximate measures do not replace the need for rigorous impact assessments. But agreement between
agencies on a small number of indicators, and their application across a wide range of interventions, would
win recognition for the achievements of the PSD community. Affordable mechanisms are needed, to ensure
that the numbers produced are credible – for example through certification of the methodologies used. Finally,
rewards for cost-effectiveness will motivate and orient practitioners.
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Preface
This Reader comes at a particular point in the history of development, and of the development of value chains
and service markets in particular. The tax-paying public in donor countries are wondering what their donor
agencies are achieving, and some people are proposing that the answer is “not much”. They can do this,
because there is little that is published about results, which is both convincing and comparable.
There are, of course, real challenges in measuring and comparing results. Those who have worked in the field
for some time will already be familiar with them, and will be looking for fresh perspectives – rather than the
usual agreement that “we ought to do more”.
This Reader aims to do exactly that, arguing that debates about rigour in methodologies have distracted from
the more important institutional and human barriers to measuring results. These barriers need to be addressed
in creative ways, as results can be estimated in ways that are affordable and not technically demanding. This
Reader will have succeeded, if it leads to greater measurement and reporting of results; comments on the text
are particularly welcome.
Ideally, there would be a crisp definition of the intended readership; in practice, however, the communities of
practice are now fluid and overlapping. Certainly, it will be of interest to those developing value chains and
service markets; it is also likely to be of interest to those engaged in broader reform of the business
environment, and indeed in private sector development (PSD) more generally.
The format of this document is a break with the past, in that it does not seek to emulate the heroic efforts of
Aly Miehlbradt and Mary McVay in profiling all recent developments in PSD. Nonetheless, Annex A includes a
list of all of the entries that have been created or updated in the last year on www.Value-Chains.org, to give a
quick overview of some of the most recent interesting publications.
My thanks to the many people who contributed substantial information to the preparation of this Reader,
including Margrethe Holm Andersen, Geeta Batra, Alwyn Chilver, Nazia Habib-Mintz, John Marsh, Peter
Roggekamp, Peter Schmidt, Don Sillers and Thom Sprenger and especially Aly Miehlbradt; the IFC workshops
on this subject were a particular inspiration. Any errors are, of course, mine. Finally, my particular thanks to
SDC for co-funding the document’s preparation and publication.
Jim Tanburn
Jim@Tanburn.com
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A. Introduction
1. Development practitioners are given
ambitious goals; they are expected to achieve very
large and measurable results, with resources that
are actually very modest, relative to the economies
they are hoping to influence. Indeed, some of the
expectations are arguably not even realistic, within
the tight timeframes and budgets of most
development agencies.
2. Furthermore, the goals are multi-layered,
usually including sound commercial performance in
the market, and a wide variety of social and
development goals; the developmental goals are
often diverse, including for example a focus on the
poorest, gender concerns, maybe a rural flavour,
mention of youth, and so on. Within this setting, it
can be difficult to identify and maintain clear
priorities, and many practitioners are therefore
juggling multiple priorities, in order to satisfy as
many of the stakeholders as possible.
3. And there are many stakeholders: donor staff
in the field and at headquarters, colleagues in the
implementing organisation, and counterparts in
government and elsewhere. In addition,
practitioners have to establish credibility with
potential partners in the private sector, who may
already be suspicious of donor-branded
programmes. All this – before questions of
measuring results arise.
4. Most people in the field are fully committed to
getting things done; arguably, they have to be, in
such a complex environment, if they are to achieve
anything. They are not, by nature, statisticians or
academics, and generally find the task of rigorous
results measurement daunting. And it cannot be
denied that rigorous measurement of results is
expensive, with sums in excess of $250,000 being
mentioned. Besides, most donor money is intended
for use in making a difference in the world, rather
than in measuring it; measurement is often
classified as an ‘overhead’, with the associated
pressures to reduce the cost to an absolute
minimum.
5. The increasing focus on ‘systemic’
approaches, where practitioners are expected to
understand entire systems, has made measurement
more challenging. Rather than just meeting the
internal needs of the system within their own agency
(and its funders), managers also have to design and
implement interventions that make sense also to the
people in a completely different system: the one
within which the intended target group lives and
works. Practitioners are no longer exerting a
calibrated influence over a carefully-controlled and
limited set of players, but seeking to influence an
entire sector of the economy.
6. One rationale for such systemic approaches is
that, by building on local dynamics, wishes and
ownership, they will be much more likely to achieve
sustainable improvements. If those improvements
are sustainable, then the ultimate impacts will be
much greater, as they will continue to accrue (and
perhaps also to grow) long after the intervention has
come to an end. According to this logic, the
longer-term impacts – and particularly the impacts
of spontaneous replications or ‘copy-cats’ – will add
up to paint a truly impressive picture of value for
money.
7. Much has been written about this shift already
(not least in previous years’ Readers) so it will not be
explored in more detail here. However, it is
important with respect to the theme of measuring
results, as it raises interesting questions about when
to measure those results. Measurement at the end
of a project may find better impacts generated by an
intervention that used subsidies liberally – but these
impacts will probably decline rapidly once the
external financing comes to an end (as in the
illustration, below).
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8. Systemic approaches, meanwhile, may take
longer to understand local dynamics and demand,
and to establish the credibility needed to catalyse
long-term changes in the market as a whole. They
do, actually, raise questions about the conventional
logic of measuring results, which usually involves an
implicit, mechanistic model of achievement: funds
paid at one end will ultimately lead to defined results
that come out at the other end of the ‘machine’. In
practice, the desired impacts of a systemic approach
may change over time, as the aspirations of the
target group evolve, and as new market-based
opportunities arise during implementation.
9. In addition, there are so many influences
being exerted on the market system that the results
achieved by any particular development programme
are unlikely to be replicated anywhere else, or at any
other point in history. Unfortunately, however, the
elegance of these arguments has distracted from the
original logic of systemic approaches: to
demonstrate greater impact. Even in programmes
where managers could have argued very
convincingly for explicit and likely impacts in the
medium term, they have very rarely done so.
Arguably, this has led to a decline in interest in the
paradigm.
10. Recent years have seen some important new
pressures being brought to bear on practitioners, to
demonstrate results in a more effective way, based
partly on the impression that the current state of
affairs is not satisfactory. The following Chapter
explores that perception in more detail.
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Start of project End of project Time
Impact
Systemic approach
Use of direct
subsidies
B. Is There Really a Lack of
Information About Results?
The previous Chapter argued that development
agencies are working in areas that are complex –
particularly with respect to systemic approaches.
The pressures to demonstrate results have also
grown – but is there really a lack of information?
11. Last year’s Reader was sub-titled: “Striving for
Tangible Results for the Poor”; it noted a “continued
failure to measure, document and disseminate
significant results in eradicating poverty, or even
reaching large numbers on a sustainable basis,
despite strong anecdotal evidence of significant
impact”.
12. Other synthesis documents have been making
similar observations for some time; one such
document for USAID in 2004, for example, reviewed
50 evaluations from various agencies1, and
concluded that “very few studies use control groups
or time series data that would allow studying change
over time and comparison of participants and
non-participants ... Self-selection was an
outstanding issue in all studies, since none of them
used random experimental design or corrected for
the problem.”
13. Similarly, the Director of the Shell Foundation
recently wrote: “what always stuns me at events like
the Global Philanthropy Forum is that so few of the
NGOs and charities presenting offer any sort of
independent validation of their impacts or present
these in a comparative framework against the
performance of other organisations in the same
field.
14. “Likewise, the assembled donors didn’t seem
too interested in documented results or in the nature
of the accountability of the presenting organisation.
Indeed in a three-day-long conference with dozens
of individual sessions, there was only one very
poorly-attended session that considered the issue of
measuring impact – and I never heard the phrase
‘customer service’ mentioned!!” 2
15. In the specific field of private sector
development (PSD), there are also many signs of a
lack of information. Altenburg and von Drachenfels,
for example, have written: “Although the BDS
debate has been under way for almost ten years and
has received a lot of attention among donor
agencies, there is still almost no empirical evidence
of sustainable BDS programmes.” 3
16. Actually, these comments demonstrate a
misunderstanding, in that they were looking for
evidence that donor-funded programmes had
achieved sustainability. There are many reasons
why BDS programmes that were started with donor
funding are unlikely to become sustainable. The
debate has been rather about how donor-funded
programmes could enhance the value addition of
BDS providers who are already operating
sustainably in the private sector; the lack of credible
research to document achievements does, however,
create the ‘space’ in which such assertions can be
made.
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1 Zandniapour et al, 2004. Review of Impact Assessments of Selected Enterprise Development Projects. DAI for AMAP BDS Knowledge
and Practice Research Task Order. http://www.microlinks.org/ev02.php?ID=7102_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC
2 http://www.shellfoundation.org/newsletter/14_05_2007/directors_message.htm
3 The ‘New Minimalist Approach’ to Private Sector Development: A Critical Assessment, by Tilman Altenburg and Christian von
Drachenfels. Development Policy Review, 2006, 24 (4): 387-411
17. Another factor supporting such assertions is
the way in which interest in a particular type of
intervention lasts perhaps 3-5 years, before agencies
move to the next ‘big thing’ 4. This is again a result
of the lack of information about results; agencies
therefore must run with concepts that are elegant
and attractive, rather than with approaches that are
proving to be effective (since proof is rarely
available, within the timescale required).
Unfortunately, programme managers may therefore
find themselves evaluated against new and more
‘up-to-date’ yardsticks, rather than against the
programme document they had been trying to
implement.
18. In the meantime, and in the absence of any
commonly accepted methodology for measuring
and reporting results, every agency – and indeed
every project – makes its own measurements and
does its own reporting. This is often under the
heading of ‘success stories’, already reinforcing the
perception that the contents are not impartial or
objective.
19. There is also the perception that the indicators
have been carefully chosen, to tell the story of the
results in the best possible light. The reader must
therefore think hard about the contents, in order to
work out what the reasonable questions might be.
Actually, many ‘success stories’ contain little or no
‘hard’ information; some include no quantified
results in any form at all, preferring to tell the story
of one or two carefully-chosen beneficiaries.
20. An example is given on the following page of
the genre – representing one of the most convincing
available, in the sense that it does provide a clear
story and some quantified impacts. While not
relating the results to the cost of the intervention,
this summary does give a clear sense of the scale
and the incomes resulting from the new seeds. The
problem is that the reader, unless she is particularly
expert in this field, cannot get a sense of whether
the intervention was successful, relative to other,
comparable programmes. It sounds good, but how
good is good?
21. Finally, there is surprisingly little
dis-aggregation of results by sex, so it is often
difficult to learn much about the impact on gender
issues. Wherever data are available from the cases
referred to in this Reader, it is included in the text.
Otherwise, and until dis-aggregation is more
thoroughly implemented, most commentators
instead note that poverty alleviation is likely to
favour women in particular, since the majority of
those living in poverty are women. Clearly, however,
more needs to be done to understand the gender
dynamics within the overall impact ‘stories’.
22. There are pressures to improve on the current
situation, and these are explored in more detail in
the following Chapter.
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4 See Reusse, 1999, The Ills of Aid (University of Chicago Press) for a more detailed discussion on this – particularly in Chapter 3.1, “The
Paradigm Life Cycle”.
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Case Study: September 2006
CHALLENGE
Farmers in Uganda, like in most of the under-developed economies, are often trapped in a vicious
cycle of poverty. They often obtain low yields resulting in low farm incomes. The low yields mean that
the farmers need unrealistically high prices in order to make profits. Yet the farmers have no control
on prices and are often vulnerable to market shocks. Like several other crops, sunflower, which has
been produced in Uganda for over a decade and is a basic feedstock in the oilseed processing
industry, was found to have yields that were insufficient to encourage farmers to continue growing the
crop and thus expand production, despite Uganda having a major and growing deficit in vegetable
oils.
INITIATIVE
When [the project] commenced operation
in 2004, it was recognized that the Sunfola
variety the farmers were planting had
degenerated and this had resulted in low
farmer confidence. [The project] advocated
for suitable hybrid varieties and
collaborated with NARO to screen
imported hybrids and open pollinated
varieties.
In partnership with A.K. Oils & Fats (U) Ltd,
[the project] promoted a new hybrid
sunflower variety, PAN 7351 to farmers in
Lira, Apac, Masindi and Sironko through
the establishment of an average of 850
farmer field demonstration sites per season
in these districts. [The project] promoted
an outgrower scheme (OGS), where the
farmers grow the crop knowing there is a
ready market.
RESULT
Over the past three years the OGS has reached a total of 31,300 farmers and generated gross earnings
of US$5,367,000 (US$2,146,800 in net incomes). Farmers have been so encouraged by the presence of
a guaranteed market that all growers are willing to pay for seed in advance of stocks arriving
in–country, in order to secure planting material. A.K. Oils & Fats (U) Ltd uses site coordinators as the
aggregation point for all seed sales (no commission paid on seed sales) as well as output aggregation
(USh 10 per kg paid to site coordinator as incentive). Site coordinators now are micro enterprises in
their own right – building stores, developing farmer skills in production (since farmer output directly
influences their revenues) and working closely with A.K. Oils & Fats (U) Ltd team.
A hybrid sunflower field in Kyatiri, Masindi district
belonging to Mr. John Kyomya. John is one of the
commercial farmers in the OGS who have adopted
the recommended production practices.
C. Pressures for Change
The previous Chapter looked at the lack of
comparable information about the impacts of
development work – particularly in private sector
development (PSD). This lack gives rise to a number
of problems, including rapid swings in interest of
development agencies, from one paradigm to
another. This Chapter examines whether the
situation is now different, relative to the situation
5 or 10 years ago.
Pressures Within the
Development Community
23. Recent years have seen some important
developments; for example, the incidence of
poverty in Asia has fallen from 32% in 1990, to 19%
today5. But the public perception is generally that
such achievements have not been due to the work
of development agencies. The Green Revolution was
seen as a developmental achievement, but since
then, development agencies have not scored many
major ‘hits’.
24. Rather, their efforts are often portrayed as
insignificant – and occasionally as doing more harm
than good. Indeed, there have been several books in
recent years, arguing this case, with eloquent titles
such as ‘Despite Good Intentions: Why
Development Assistance to the Third World has
Failed’ and ‘The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects
of Foreign Aid and International Charity’.
25. William Easterly has written another in the
genre: ‘White Man’s Burden: How the West’s Efforts
to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill’; he asks:
“why have aid interventions where it is so difficult to
tell whether they are working or not? What
incentives follow from objectives for which you can’t
hold anyone accountable if they are not met?”
26. He concludes: “1) Don’t do things that can’t
be evaluated. 2) Don’t design an aid program such
that there are no consequences of a negative
evaluation. 3) Don’t use the word ‘evaluation’ when
what you are describing is not an independent
evaluation of a specific intervention for which
somebody can be held accountable.” 6
27. Indeed, agencies have for years published
manuals about how to measure results – usually
involving a menu of options of what to measure, and
advice on how to measure them. The following was
published in 1996:
28. “The development of objective indicators of
performance is .. essential for the public
accountability of the MDBs [Multilateral Development
Banks] and their ability to justify their use of public
resources to shareholder governments, parliaments,
and the public. Currently, it is not possible to
compare their operational results, or even to describe
them in a common language. Major public sector
institutions like the MDBs must be able to account for
their efforts in readily understood terms.
29. “A common methodology for evaluating their
portfolios should be developed and kept up to date
over time, with best practices in evaluation
techniques being identified and disseminated.
A determined effort should be made to harmonize
performance indicators and evaluation criteria,
taking into account the differing circumstances of
each institution. The lessons learned from these
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5 Mallon, 2006. Asia Overview Paper. Prepared for the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development Conference, Bangkok.
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/132/Day1PlenaryMallon.pdf
6 IFC Outcomes newsletter, March-June 2007
www.ifc.org/ifcext/sme.nsf//AttachmentsByTitle/OutcomesNewsletter.pdf/$FILE/OutcomesNewsletter.pdf See also
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly
evaluations should be shared among the MDBs with
a view to applying them quickly in new operations.”7
30. In practice, however, little progress has been
made on an inter-agency basis in developing a
common methodology. Most agencies apparently
struggle, even to conform to their own
good-practice guidelines – although this could be
interpreted as suggesting that the current guidelines
do not address core concerns of either the agency
or its staff. The chart, below, gives IFC’s assessment
of the extent to which this is the case8.
31. Researchers continue to try to define which
types of intervention will give the best value for
money. One example is the Copenhagen Consensus9,
which identified some interventions as being the
‘best’, including for example HIV/Aids prevention,
promotion of dietary supplements and the
liberalisation of trade. Similarly, another study
reported that the traditional donor priority sector of
education did not seem to be effective (finding no
correlation between increased access to education,
and increases in prosperity)10. These types of analysis
illustrate the interest of many people to define the
most cost-effective ways to invest their development
funds; they remain, however, controversial.
32. The pressures continue, though, to do more;
for example, when Robert Zoellick was recently
appointed as President of the World Bank, he was
“told by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr. and
others that the bank must do more to provide
definitive measures of the effects of its $23 billion in
lending to poor countries, in part to assure Congress
about how the money is being spent.” 11
The Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness
33. Donors have certainly been challenged to
respond to the accusations that they are not as
effective as they might be. One of the better-known
responses recently has been the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness, in March 200512. This Declaration
proposed that funds increasingly be channelled
through partner governments. It also pledged to
reduce by one-third “the proportion of countries
without transparent and monitorable performance
assessment frameworks”, by the year 2010.
34. There is, however, concern about progress in
consolidating aid assistance in this way; the OECD
wrote recently that “at country level, the 2006 Survey
also raises serious concerns about the high costs of
delivering and managing aid [emphasis in original
text]. In 2005, the 34 developing countries covered by
the survey received 10,507 donor missions, more
than one for each working day. Even those that
explicitly asked for “quiet periods” to get on with their
day-to-day work were not always spared.”13
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Meeting Good Practice Standards
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7 Development Committee, Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks, “Serving a Changing World—Report of the Task Force on Multilateral
Development Banks,” March 15, 1996, p. 18. As cited in MDB Evaluation Cooperation Group Working Group on Private Sector Evaluation:
Good-Practice Standards for Evaluation of Private Sector Investment Operations, 2006 www.adb.org/Evaluation/GPS-3rd-edition.pdf
8 http://www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/141/Michelitsch.pdf
9 www.copenhagenconsensus.com
10 Lewis, 2004. The Power of Productivity: Wealth, Poverty and the Threat to Global Stability. McKinsey and Co. / the University of
Chicago Press
11 International Herald Tribune, 1st June 2007. Zoellick signals plans to revamp World Bank
12 Available from many sites, including http://www1.worldbank.org/harmonization/Paris/FINALPARISDECLARATION.pdf
13 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/3/38435815.pdf
35. There is also concern about what this
proposal means for PSD; the Paris Declaration does
not identify an explicit role for the private sector in
donor-funded assistance. PSD practitioners would
expect the private sector to be closely involved in
both the design and the implementation of that
assistance, implying a more nuanced approach than
simply channelling all funds through the partner
government. In principle, this can be taken into
account through the participation of the private
sector in the preparation of the national Poverty
Reduction Strategy; in practice, however, such
inputs are not always achieved. Anyway, the
participation of the private sector should be
continuous, rather than through a one-off exercise.
36. Another problem in channelling PSD support
exclusively through partner governments is that
there are usually many Ministries involved in one
way or another in PSD. Again, therefore, PSD
practitioners are challenged to show that the results
of a more nuanced approach justify the extra
complication.
New Players
37. The private sector has itself become a major
influence recently, and this influence is likely to grow
further, in the coming years. Many companies are
seeing development issues increasingly as part of
their core business model, for a variety of reasons.
38. New social investors, such as Acumen, are
also emerging. Some of these new players are vocal
and media-savvy – including for example the Shell
Foundation, quoted above. The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, Google.org and other ‘thought
leaders’ are having an influence far beyond their
(substantial) funds; the Gates Foundation, for
example, notes as one of its Guiding Principles:
“delivering results with the resources we have been
given is of the utmost importance – and we seek and
share information about those results”.
39. Some additional examples of relatively new
organisations in this trend are given below:
■ the Sustainable Food Lab,
www.sustainablefoodlab.org; launched by the
Kellogg Foundation and Unilever, now with 70
members – including both companies (such as
General Mills, Ahold, Starbucks and JPMorgan
Chase) and Foundations (such as Gates, Oxfam,
Shell and Technoserve)
■ the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative
(SAI)(www.saiplatform.org); SAI was founded to
support sustainable agriculture, by Danone,
Nestle and Unilever; members now include
Coca-Cola, Findus, Kraft and McDonalds
■ the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) (www.wbcsd.org), whose
membership now includes 190 companies
■ the Business Social Compliance Initiative
(www.bsci-eu.org) for ethical procurement, which
has about 70 retailers, importers and
manufacturers in Europe as its members
■ EurepGAP (www.eurepgap.org) is a private
sector body that sets voluntary standards for the
certification of agricultural products
■ A ‘Private Sector in Development Initiative’,
launched recently to (among other things) “define
common standards for measuring and reporting
economic, social and environmental impacts” 14
■ Business Action for Africa
(BAA)(www.businessactionforafrica.org) has 150
members (80% coming from the business sector)
40. Indeed, very many of the people involved in
these initiatives, coming from the private sector,
pride themselves on performing against agreed
metrics; they bring with them the assumption that
this will be both possible and desirable in the field of
PSD. While not all their expectations will necessarily
be realised, they are nonetheless much more
oriented towards achieving measurable results, than
some practitioners are used to. The pressure to
report results is, therefore, likely to increase in the
near future.
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41. Other initiatives have grown up to support this
trend. The Financial Times, for example, recently
partnered with Dalberg (a consultancy firm) and the
UN Global Compact to invite businesses to rate their
non-profit partners15; this initiative is explained in
more detail in a subsequent Chapter. Similarly, there
has been a rise in training courses on poverty,
business and development16.
42. Similarly, the Clinton Global Initiative and
Dalberg recently published a report accusing
mainstream development agencies of insufficient
demand orientation, being costly and slow, and
lacking innovation and accountability.
Recommendations included creating transparent
reporting and standards for programme delivery and
supply chain performance, no longer “rewarding
failure”, and using accountability to create a system
that is responsive and dynamic 17.
43. Finally, development aid has enjoyed a higher
profile in recent years, for example through the
Live8 series of concerts. While this has increased
substantially the political support for development
aid, it has also made the issue of results more
challenging – public opinion is not particularly
interested in the finer points of evaluation
methodology or systemic change.
44. The international landscape is also changing,
with new donors emerging; this year, for example,
“China pledged $20 billion to finance trade and
infrastructure across [Africa] over the next three
years” 18. Indeed, China’s trade with Africa already
exceeded $55 billion in 2006. Countries such as
Mexico, South Korea and Poland are also becoming
significant donors, potentially bringing their
domestic PSD experiences to the discussion.
45. All of these pressures have led donor
agencies to place a high priority on measuring
results; in a recent survey, members of the Donor
Committee for Enterprise Development voted the
broad category of “impact assessment,
benchmarking of results” as the highest priority for
the Committee in the coming years19.
46. The following Chapter reviews the current
methodologies in use, and is intended as a Primer
on the subject. Seasoned practitioners, therefore,
may prefer to go directly to the following Chapter.
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17 http://www.dalberg.com/pdfs/taskforce.pdf
18 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/20/asia/zambia.php
19 www.enterprise-development.org/resources/item.asp?resourceid=387
D. Methodologies in Use: A Primer
The previous Chapter argued that the pressures for
development agencies to report on their relative
achievements are now greater than before. This
Chapter provides a Primer on methodologies for
measuring impacts. It is not intended to be
comprehensive, as there are many guides now
published, which cover similar ground, more
comprehensively20. Experienced practitioners can
probably move directly to the following Chapter.
Monitoring or Evaluation?
47. Discussions about measurement of results
often refer to “monitoring and evaluation” or M and
E, whereas these two terms refer to two separate
concepts. Monitoring is about on-going
measurement of performance, particularly looking at
parameters like efficiency; are things being done
right? Ideally, these kinds of measurements can lead
to improvements during implementation; they are
often conducted internally by the intervention team.
48. Evaluation, however, is the focus of this
Reader; it is often conducted by external
consultants, and is about proving impacts (rather
than improving interventions). It is answering
questions about whether the right things are being
done, and tends to be rather more sensitive –
because it is potentially a measure of the
performance of the programme design, and of the
implementing team, and of the implementing
agency. Reputations and careers are potentially at
stake.
49. Evaluations conducted at the end of
programmes are referred to as ‘ex-post’, while
assessments of anticipated impacts conducted
during the programme design process are referred
to as ‘ex-ante’. Ideally, ex-ante evaluations would
make rational spending decisions possible.
50. The following discussion will focus on
evaluation, rather than on monitoring. Historically,
evaluations have tended to look at outputs (e.g.
number of people trained), but are now increasingly
looking at outcomes (e.g. changes in behaviour as a
result of the training). The term ‘impact’ refers to the
developmental results that donors ultimately seek as
a consequence of the outcomes (e.g. jobs created,
people lifted out of poverty). Impacts are the most
difficult to measure with rigour, and to report in
ways that would convince someone who is sceptical
about the intervention.
The Core Task
51. The core task in measuring impacts is to
‘establish the counter-factual’: to discover what
would have happened, if the intervention had not
taken place at all. All reporting of results implicitly
covers the counter-factual; the message is always:
‘without our intervention, this would not have
happened’. In practice, of course, the counter-factual
is tricky to establish, for various reasons:
■ ‘attribution’: one has to demonstrate that the
measured impacts resulted from the intervention,
rather than from other interventions (perhaps by
another agency), or from something completely
different
■ ‘displacement’: one also has to demonstrate that
those who did not benefit directly from the
intervention did not suffer, at the expense of
those who did benefit (the ‘treatment group’); for
example, did management training enable some
entrepreneurs to do better, penalising those who
did not receive the training?
■ ‘deadweight’: a sceptic might wonder if the
observed impacts would not have happened
anyway, for example just as a continuation of
prior trends (see illustration, below)
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■ ‘Hawthorne effect’: people who are being studied
may change their behaviour – just because they
are being studied21.
■ substitution is similar, in considering the
possibility that the treatment group changed its
behaviour as a result of the prospect of treatment.
52. To illustrate the question of attribution,
consider the example of a bridge built to link an
island to the mainland; each span of the bridge has
been built by a different agency – a good example of
donor coordination. Once the bridge is completed,
trade between the island and the mainland improves
greatly, benefiting many islanders22. All 3 donors
might claim to have achieved the total impact, since
without their part of the bridge, there would have
been no impact at all. Besides, others involved in
boosting the trade, such as the banks and the State,
deserve some of the credit. How much, therefore, of
the total impact can each individual donor claim?
53. None of these aspects are trivial, and the
frequent practice of measuring the performance of
enterprises before and after the intervention is not
effective in addressing any of them (for example,
their performance might have improved, but the
performance of enterprises who did not receive any
help might have improved even more). At the
minimum, the team responsible for implementation
should always be clear about their causal model:
what the implementing agency expects to happen as
a result of the intervention. This is explored in more
detail in the following Section.
The Causal Model
54. In the mind of any practitioner is an implicit
causal model: the expectation that the various
inputs (funding, expertise, information) will
ultimately lead to certain developmental impacts,
through a sequence of events. Each event or change
is the direct result of the previous one; each step is
required to achieve the next one, and (ultimately)
the final impact expected.
55. The following diagram illustrates a generic
causal model, with each stage leading to the next;
once this is made explicit, the measurement of
results becomes more manageable. The practitioner
only has to measure the achievement at each stage,
and to show that the achievement was the result of
the achievement of the previous stage.
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Impact
Deadweight
Indicator
Time
Start of intervention Time of impact assessment
With intervention
No intervention
IslandMain Land
21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawthorne_effect
22 Thanks to Peter Roggekamp for this example
56. Another illustration of a causal model is given
below; this is an extract from the Technoserve
Annual Report for 2006, reporting on impacts
achieved)23. This sort of reporting has probably
contributed to the recent placing of Technoserve in
the top 5 organisations, as rated by businesses for
quality of partnership24; “companies rated
Accountability and Execution as being the most
important performance categories in their evaluation
of partners”.
57. Historically, many evaluations have reported
on outputs, but struggled to say much about either
outcomes or impacts; the introduction of logical
framework approaches (log frames) has been an
attempt to require programme designers, at least, to
be explicit about the sorts of outcomes and impacts
that they were expecting. They also require some
estimation of the likely chances of success, and
specification of the possible risks at each stage.
58. In practice, however, its potential complexity
and rigour seem to have deterred some from using
the log-frame as an implementation tool – even
though it has certainly led to improvements in
design in some cases. A simpler approach, that still
required programme designers and implementers to
be explicit about what they were expecting to see,
may be more appropriate for wide application.
59. The causal model should provide the
‘backbone’ of any measurement of impacts, giving
clear pointers as to what to measure, and when; it
is, however, only valid, in the linear way outlined
above, for discrete elements within an overall
system (such as a value chain, or the private sector
as a whole). Some have taken the argument further,
to try to model an entire value chain; the illustration
below was prepared using modelling software called
Vensim, to model the cocoa value chain in
Indonesia25. It was presented during the Chiang Mai
Seminar by the author, who is currently working
with Swisscontact.
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Inputs (funding,
expertise,
information etc.)
Activities
(programme
implementation)
Outputs (people
trained,
information
published etc.)
Outcomes
(behaviour changes,
businesses perform
better)
Impacts (poor people
find jobs, their
incomes increase)
Transform Lives
Nearly 1 million rural men, women and children benefited from
these income sources (based on 5 people per family)
Building Businesses and Industries –
The Results:
Build Businesses and Industries
Technoserve assisted 215 businesses in more
than a dozen industries in 2006
Increase Revenues
These businesses earned $97 million in revenues
and $6 million in profits
Employ People
They paid $6 million
in wages to 10,600
employees
Buy Products
They bought $52 million worth
of products from 173,200
small-scale producers
23 http://www.technoserve.org/documents/TNS2006AR.pdf
24 FT, Dalberg and UN Global Compact www.ft.com/reports/philanthropy2007 although note that “core business and advocacy
partnerships are perceived to have higher impact than those focused on philanthropy”.
25 Borer, Manfred, 2006. Application of System Dynamics in the International Development Cooperation. Analysis of decision taking
among Cocoa Farmers in Flores. Thesis Business Process Manager, University of Applied Sciences, North-western Switzerland.
60. The important point about this model is not so
much its predictive capability, but more its value in
enabling staff to think through the logic of their
interventions. The design of this kind of model
requires those involved to be more explicit about
what they see as the key influences during
implementation, and their relative importance in
achieving the desired outcomes. It does also allow
the effects of important delays to be included in the
thinking; in this particular case, for example, there is
a delay between the planting of fresh cacao trees
and the first harvest of cocoa, which needs to be
taken into account when measuring impacts.
61. Once staff are more explicit about the causal
model (or models) implicit in their work, then it is
possible to validate this model, and measure the
results, in more objective ways. Those ways are
explored in more detail, in the following Section.
Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs
62. The most rigorous approach to measurement
is to establish a group of people or enterprises that
are identical in every way to the treatment group,
except that they do not receive the treatment (the
‘control group’). For the sake of measurement, the
samples of both treatment and control groups
should be selected at random, hence the term
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs).
63. RCTs are, from a theoretical point of view, the
‘gold standard’ or ‘default option’; they represent a
fully experimental design. In other words, given a
substantial measurement budget and adequate
expertise, all impacts should be measured through
RCTs26. A truly randomised approach, with a
convincing control group and sufficiently large
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samples, avoids the need for a baseline; statistical
analysis can show, beyond reasonable doubt, that
the benefits were due to the treatment, or support,
provided.
64. There are, however, many reasons why it can
be practically impossible to establish a control group
of high quality; these reasons are discussed in the
following Chapter. In such cases, one alternative is a
‘quasi-experimental’ approach, in which a control
group is constructed to be as like the treatment group
as possible – and then a random sample is taken from
each group for measurement. In this approach,
measurements are taken before (‘baseline’) and after
treatment. This is therefore sometimes known as a
‘differences of differences’ method.
65. There are a number of sophisticated statistical
methods that can be applied, to enhance the
accuracy of this sort of approach, but they will not
be explored in detail here. Further information is
available from, for example, the Poverty Action Lab
at MIT (www.povertyactionlab.com). 27
Proxies
66. Finally, there is another promising avenue for
measuring results at less cost than the direct
measurement of the desired impacts: the
measurement of proxies. Direct measurement of
something like economic activity can be very
costly, but there are indicators that might
reasonably be expected to be closely correlated
with economic activity – but which are much
cheaper to measure; this might include, for
example, traffic through the local bus park or
electricity consumption locally.
67. These are known as proxies, and normally
need to be validated – in other words, to be
demonstrated to correlate closely with the
indicator for which they are intended to be a
proxy. This requires more rigorous and costly
measurement, ideally using RCTs; such validation
does not, however, need to be carried out every
time.
MEASURING AND REPORTING RESULTS
THE 2008 READER ON PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT14
A relatively thorough example of the application of a causal model to measurement of impacts, on a
limited budget, was conducted in Vietnam in 200227. The study looked for changes in management
practices, 4-6 months after delivery of a short training course in management skills – relative to a baseline
and to a control group. It then looked for changes in business performance, for example through
innovation, changes in sales and employment, and growth in income.
Having established changes in business performance, the study then investigated the developmental
outcomes that could be resulting from these changes; since the trainees were women entrepreneurs, for
example, the impact on gender relations was examined. The survey found a significant increase in
incomes of the women, but the increase in employment was not significant, partly because the sample
size was too small.
Admittedly, the research suffered from some significant shortcomings; for example, questionnaires were
administered by mail, and the results were calculated only for those recipients who responded.
Nonetheless, the report shows that it is possible to develop a plausible story about likely impacts, on a
rather limited budget, by carefully thinking through the implicit causal model.
Management Training for
Women Entrepreneurs in Vietnam
27 Voeten, 2002. Management Training Effects on Women Entrepreneurs who own and manage MSEs. Vietnam/Maastricht School of
Management. www.value-chains.org/dyn/valuechains/docs/250/TWMSE2%20working%20paper%203.pdf
E. A Discussion of the
Methodological Options
The previous Chapter outlined the main tools
available to people measuring impacts; it argued
above all that implementers need to be clear and
explicit about the ‘causal model’ on which their
programme is based. The tools available to validate
that model are discussed below.
Randomised Controlled
Trials (RCTs)
68. Some academics argue that randomised
controlled trials (RCTs) are the ‘default option’ –
David Storey of Warwick University suggests that
there is no middle ground between randomised
trials and “asking a man in a pub”. Strictly speaking,
he is probably correct; the reality on the ground is,
however, more nuanced, and RCTs suffer from a
number of constraints and limitations.
69. A major constraint in practice is that RCTs are
relatively expensive and technically demanding to
do well; some argue that they are not even always
necessary, since the attribution or causality may
already be rather clear. The impacts of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the Balkans illustrate
this assertion well, in the sense that the causality is
rather evident. It can be argued with reasonable
plausibility that ADR has reduced business costs by
over 42m28.
70. Another example is provided by the impacts of
cell-phones for poor fishermen in India29; apparently,
prices paid to the fishermen stabilised and became
more predictable. In addition, reductions in wastage
reduced the final price to the consumer; it seems
clear that all of these effects can reasonably be
attributed to the advent of cell-phones, without a
pressing need to conduct RCTs.
71. Most importantly, RCTs can be problematic in
interventions aiming to develop whole markets, and
to build on commercial dynamics. Indeed, many of
the examples used to illustrate the merits of RCT
relate to delivery of public services; this is
somewhat easier than PSD to control, and not
subject to spontaneous replication or market
development. But it is difficult to construct RCTs that
take into account spontaneous replication outside
the treatment group (and potentially into the control
group); many interventions to develop markets are
working hard to encourage such replications.
72. Also, recipients of the benefits of market
development programmes are self-selecting,
meaning that selection bias is very difficult to avoid.
A further factor is that market development
interventions are often several steps removed from
the actual target group; the intermediaries are likely
to be in the private sector, with cost structures close
to the target group, and therefore to be poorly
placed for major data-gathering and reporting
exercises.
73. In addition, RCTs suffer from a number of
other potential drawbacks:
■ control groups are often ‘contaminated’ with
treatment from other programmes and agencies
■ some things cannot be randomised (e.g.
exchange rate policy) and others may be hard to
quantify (e.g. empowerment).
■ there are examples of RCTs where errors were
made in what to measure, assumptions of
causality, etc.; the methodology may not be
applied correctly (while still giving the illusion of
precision).
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74. There are also concerns about the Hawthorne
effect: those randomly denied support (if they are
aware of the situation) may either give up, or try
harder, in order to prove the programme staff
wrong. Either way, the measurement of impacts of
the treatment would be skewed by the altered
behaviour, and expertise is required to minimise
such effects.
75. Some practitioners object to the
randomisation of treatment, on the basis that it
would not be ethical to refuse (or postpone) support
to some people who were eligible for it, just for the
sake of the experiment. However, it would
presumably be even less ethical to provide
assistance to businesses without being clear about
the likely effects and impacts of that assistance.
Randomisation in this case is probably the best way
to assess those impacts.
76. The comments, above, about the cost of RCTs
imply a question about the appropriate proportion of
a programme’s budget that should be allocated to
measuring the impact; while this question is often
asked, there is regrettably no single answer. There
may be cases where an expensive study is fully
justified, for example in validating the impacts of a
new approach, or in validating a proxy. In general,
however, there is a feeling that measurement costs
should not greatly exceed 10% of the overall
programme costs.
77. Given also that relatively few programmes
anyway seem to have the resources to conduct full
RCTs, what are the other options for measuring
impacts?
Alternatives to
Experimental Designs
78. Many practitioners favour a qualitative
approach, exploring in detail what has actually
happened as a result of the intervention or
treatment. This exploration is necessarily somewhat
open-ended, probably identifying both positive and
negative outcomes. There are many case studies
written along these lines, and in practice, such an
approach will always be needed – at the minimum,
to complement, and to make sense of, any
quantitative measurements.
79. A core question is who is involved in
preparation of such case studies; often, they are
prepared by the programme staff themselves, which
means that they reflect an intimate knowledge of the
programme, but may not be perceived as impartial
or objective. Case studies prepared by outsiders
may be more credible, especially if the authors have
not been commissioned and paid by the programme
itself.
80. Some favour participatory approaches,
whereby the opinions of those affected by the
programme are key to the evaluation. In theory, and
particularly from an ideological point of view, this is
not just desirable, but necessary – to be able to
interpret the data, and as an input to the design of
future programmes. But participatory approaches on
their own are not a substitute for – or morally
superior to – more quantified approaches, as they
do not allow for any objective comparison beyond
the programme itself. They also give little indication
of progress in alleviating poverty, or in improving
people’s lives.
81. Nonetheless, league tables can be generated
from such perceptions, in some circumstances; in
business environment reform, for example,
Transparency International rank the level of
corruption in a country according to perceptions of
respondents. Similarly, the Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of the
World Bank and EBRD measures perceptions of
business people about the business environment,
and generates a ranking based on that.
82. Such an approach would be in contrast, for
example, to the Cost of Doing Business survey,
which aims to quantify parameters such as the
number of days to register a business, according to
a standard methodology.
83. Another example of a subjective ranking,
already referred to above, was produced recently by
the Financial Times, Dalberg and the UN Global
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Compact30, who ranked non-profit organisations
according to the perceptions of businesses about
how effective they were. Four criteria were applied:
accountability, adaptability, communication and
execution. The top organisations globally were
voted as shown in the table below.
84. Such approaches are important, and are
mentioned here, partly because they often attract
extensive media coverage; technocratic discussions
about evaluation methodologies, in contrast, are far
from the public eye, with the associated risks and
benefits. But subjective rankings raise a number of
important methodological issues; for example, it is
not very clear from the survey reported above which
businesses and which non-profit partners were
included (the list does not seem to be
comprehensive).
85. Also, such rankings do not necessarily tell us
much about the relative cost-effectiveness of a
programme; if, for example, it was making very
generous hand-outs, one would expect the
programme’s recipients to have a very positive
perception – even if the impacts in the longer term
are negligible, or even negative.
Agency Rankings of
Own Programmes
86. In the absence of agreement about
methodologies, some agencies resort to a
somewhat subjective overall rating of their
programmes. Development banks in particular often
rate their programmes by the perceived degree of
success, giving a headline verdict – for example
between ‘Very successful’ and ‘Moderately
successful’; the overall portfolio of programmes
may achieve success rates of 80% or more. Given
the contexts in which the programmes operate, this
seems optimistic.
87. Indeed, success rates of commercial
investments are often little more than 50%, as staff
have to beat the market average31. In venture capital,
success rates are usually 20% or less, with the big
successes compensating for the under-performers.
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Rank Organisation
Country
of HQ
Accountability Adaptability Communication Execution
1 Lions Club International USA 5.0 4.8 4.3 4.3
2 Environmental Defence USA 4.7 4.3 4.9 4.4
3 WRI USA 4.8 4.2 4.7 4.4
4 TechnoServe USA 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.2
5 Rotary International USA 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.4
6 GBC HIV/AIDS USA 4.3 4.4 4.1 4.5
7 Conservation International USA 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.2
8 WWF Switzerland 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4
9 CARE USA 4.6 4.0 4.4 4.3
10 Greenpeace Netherlands 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.0
30 FT, Dalberg and UN Global Compact www.ft.com/reports/philanthropy2007
31 50% of investment projects evaluated by WBG’s IEG were successful at a real ERR of about 15%.
www.mmw4p.org/dyn/mmw4p/docs/585/Michelitsch.pdf
And the social aspects of development programmes
are probably even more challenging than the
market-related ones. Credibility therefore becomes
the core problem; self-assessments of success are
not convincing; systematic judgements that include
subjective elements are not convincing either.
88. One illustration of this is provided by the
evaluations of the training voucher scheme of the
World Bank in Kenya. Initially, the Bank Performance
in this scheme was rated as Highly Satisfactory in
the ICR Review, but a subsequent and more detailed
PPAR evaluation32 by the Operations Evaluation
Department (now the IEG) in 2005 down-graded that
rating to Unsatisfactory – a major difference of
opinion.
Building Systems for
Management
89. Most evaluation methodologies present a list
of indicators that can or should be measured, either
leaving the evaluator to choose which ones to use,
or suggesting a suite of indicators which, taken
together, give a good picture of the extent of the
achievements. Various organisations are
experimenting with – or have already adopted –
interfaces that allow staff to use a range of
performance-related data. DEG, for example
(see illustration), has adopted such an approach to
indicate at a glance the relative health of its
portfolio, according to various attributes.
90. The Acumen Fund is also working with
private-sector partners such as Google.org to
develop a system for social investors. While initially
designed for use by Acumen, it may also in the future
be possible for several social investors to access the
same system. This would enable them to coordinate
their support for individual social entrepreneurs, for
example, and to share common metrics – as part of a
wider conversation between social investors around
performance evaluation and impact assessment.
91. At the time of writing, Acumen has not yet
decided which developmental indicators to measure
across the whole organisation, beyond the business
and operational ones. They might, for example,
relate the ‘increase in number of lives impacted’ to
‘increase in net income’, to see whether the
outreach is increasing over time.
92. Both of these systems require staff to quantify
approximately the likely development-related
outcomes of each set of activities; the resulting
scores allow managers to generate up-to-date visual
displays of the overall state of the current agency
portfolio. Above all, they are relatively easy to use,
and are therefore likely to be used in practice.
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93. This approach is also realistic, in the sense
that reality is multi-faceted, and limiting
measurement to a few numbers is always going to
strip out important detail. One example of this
approach is currently being applied to measure the
success of Public Private Dialogue (PPD), using an
evaluation ‘wheel’ (see illustration above); this
graphical approach enables comparison of
achievements across programmes and countries33.
94. The methodology does also report on
quantified outcomes, for example in terms of
private-sector savings ($310m), and the implicit return
on investment ($291 per dollar invested) through PPD
in the Mekong region. An additional, important aspect
of this methodology is that it considers how PPD
programmes and countries evolve over time, and the
phases through which they pass in that evolution –
a dimension that is often ignored.
95. All of the approaches mentioned in this
Chapter are briefly summarised in the following
Table; in practice, of course, they are not mutually
exclusive, but likely to be complementary, and best
used in combination, depending on the
circumstances and budget.
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Approach Advantages Disadvantages
Experimental designs Credible Demanding, in cost and expertise
Rankings of perceptions Attract media attention Dependent on methodology;
subjective
Agency rankings Simple internal tool Susceptible to internal influences
Systems with graphical interface Easy to read, therefore likely to be
used
Not in themselves rigorous or
reliable
33 www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/141/Herzberg.pdf See also www.PublicPrivateDialogue.org
F. Indicators (‘What to Measure’)
The previous Chapter outlined the main methods in
use to measure impacts – the ‘how to measure’
question; it argues that there is no one method that
will always be most appropriate, and a combination
is required. This Chapter focuses on the choice of
indicators, or ‘what to measure’.
96. The choice of what to measure, or ‘indicator’,
is perhaps the most important in the development
field, since it implicitly defines the priorities of the
intervention. There is, therefore, an immediate split
between some agencies that focus on poverty
alleviation directly, and other agencies that give
priority to overall PSD.
Poverty Alleviation or
Economic Growth?
97. The indicators will be different; in the former
case, agencies are likely to want to measure the
number of people lifted out of poverty, for example
in relation to the Millennium Development Goals.
The latter agencies are more likely to measure
indicators like private-sector savings, or the volume
of investment that they have leveraged from the
private sector – on the assumption that these will
lead to pro-poor PSD.
98. This Reader will tend to focus more on the
former: the extent to which development activities
are alleviating poverty over time. This is partly
because it is more difficult, methodologically, and
partly because it probably addresses the urgent
agenda outlined in previous Chapters – for example
around the need of tax-payers in donor countries to
understand more about what is being achieved with
‘their’ money.
99. Even with a focus on poverty alleviation, there
are several divergences of view. Governments in
developing countries, for example, will often place
high priority on the generation of employment
opportunities, since half of their population are
typically children who are growing up and who will
soon be looking for jobs. Social stability depends, in
this line of thinking, on the private sector generating
job opportunities for many of these young adults,
quickly.
100. The measurement of jobs is, however,
complex in the poorer countries, since employment
is often highly seasonal (in agricultural economies)
and is usually informal (without an employment
contract, for example). It is also often part-time;
finally, it may be unpaid, or paid in kind. The
employee may be performing the job because of the
lack of alternatives, or in the hope of accruing
goodwill and social capital – including reciprocal
support in the future.
101. Labour statisticians tend to count people as
employed if they are not unemployed – in other
words, if they have worked for at least one hour
during the reference period (typically one week);
that is not particularly helpful for practitioners
aiming to generate and measure additional
employment opportunities. Given the part-time
nature of many of those opportunities, they are
often added together, to constitute Full-Time
Equivalent (FTE) jobs – in broad terms, two half-time
jobs would make one FTE job, for example34.
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Measuring
Programme Costs
102. The above discussion is
essentially about the benefits of an
intervention, however defined;
ultimately, they should be related to the
costs, in order to arrive at a cost-benefit
ratio. Although the costs should in
principle be an easier figure to obtain, it
is not often published.
103. Ultimately, it would be helpful to
reach agreement about which costs
should be included; how should
programme management costs, for
example, be pro-rated across a wide
range of activities? Should managers
keep timesheets to enable this figure to
be calculated? Should the costs to the
government, the beneficiaries and
others be factored in?
104. These questions have not been
addressed in any systematic way,
although some of the studies outlined
later in this Reader do consider them.
Therefore, the following Chapter
focuses in more detail on indicators of
poverty, with particular reference to the
Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).
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G. PSD and the MDGs
The previous Chapter argued that the choice of
‘what to measure’ depends on the core priority for
the programme; many donors are increasingly
feeling that they will need to have a response to the
Millennium Development Goals35 as the deadline of
2015 approaches. Since PSD potentially cuts across
many MDGs, they are discussed in more detail,
below.
105. The most important MDG for PSD
practitioners is probably MDG 1, to “reduce by half
the proportion of people living on less than a dollar
a day”. Importantly, few agencies are currently
measuring this indicator in their PSD programmes,
for a range of reasons. One is that it is difficult for
practitioners in the field to implement the 1993 level
of purchasing power parity (PPP) concept of the
dollar in the MDG. Another is that many people live
in communities that straddle this income level, in a
state of flux just above or just below it; capturing the
precise transition in a credible way is tricky.
106. Some therefore prefer to measure those living
on less than $2 per day, using a dollar measurement
that can be taken from field measurements (rather
than PPP calculations). However, such complexities
again may not offer the ‘sound-bite’ that journalists
and others are looking for, when reporting on the
achievements of development agencies. Many
agencies are therefore actively exploring what the
term ‘poverty’ means, depending on the local
context – and in ways which can be measured.
107. USAID has been mandated by the US
Congress to ensure that at least 50% of all USAID
micro-enterprise funds benefit the very poor. To
provide a check on whether this mandate is being
met, Congress has more recently instructed USAID
to develop low-cost methods to identify the poorest
households, and to require that USAID-supported
micro-enterprise programs use these methods to
assess how many of their beneficiaries are very
poor36.
108. After exploring some generic methods to
identify the very poor, it became clear that the
characteristics of households living in extreme
poverty vary from one country to another. More
focused tools are therefore being developed, to take
account of local context.
109. Similarly, CGAP, Grameen and Ford are
proposing a tool called the Progress out of Poverty
Index (PPI), to be used over time to determine
improvements in client economic levels and their
ultimate graduation out of poverty. These would be
country-specific; in the example of the Philippines,
they would include the materials used in house
construction, the type of toilet, ownership of a gas
stove, children in school and number of televisions
owned. The aim is that such baskets of indicators
can be used as proxies for income levels in the
household37.
110. The Performance Measurement Framework
(PMF) was included in the Donor Committee’s
Guiding Principles on Business Development
Services, primarily in the form of a list of indicators38.
These indicators were essentially proxies for ultimate
impact; in other words, they were based on an
assumption that increased purchase of business
services (for example) was positively correlated with
business growth, increases in incomes and/or
employment etc. In practice, validation of these
proxies would require substantial investment, one
which was never actually made.
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111. Arguably, though, the challenges of
measurement in PSD are likely to become more
relevant in future, in other developmental
disciplines, like education and health; increasingly,
policy makers are realising that the private sector is
already playing a central role in the provision of
many basic services. The winning essay in the 2006
FT/IFC competition, for example, makes a very
convincing case for the major role played by the
private sector in many countries, in the provision of
education39:
112. “Recent research has found a large majority of
schoolchildren in selected poor urban and
peri-urban areas of India and Sub-Saharan Africa
using private schools, while in rural India, half of all
schoolchildren are privately enrolled. Even in
impoverished rural China large numbers of private
schools exist off the official radar.
113. “The research showed that private schools for
the poor are superior to government [schools:]
schoolteachers are more committed, the provision
of important inputs better, and education outcomes
better even after controlling for background
variables. All this is accomplished for a fraction of
the per-pupil teacher cost of government schools.”
114. Others note a comparable situation in health
care; rural dispensaries are often the first point of
contact for people in poverty seeking primary health
care. Even when people arrive at government
facilities, the situation may not be very different from
that in the private sector; “‘the problem with the
[government] primary health centres [in Uganda] is
that you have to give money to each and every
health worker that attends you . . . but in private
clinics or hospitals, you just pay once’. Another
person said, ‘the treatment you get in the primary
health centre is in relation to the amount of money
you pay’ and they ‘are the same as the private
clinics because in both places, you need to pay’.”40
115. Yet others argue that the private sector can
help to meet the MDGs in areas such as rural
sanitation41; however, such observations remain
controversial for the time being, and mainstream
opinion perceives publicly-funded provision of
health and education services to be the key to
meeting the MDGs in those sectors. Therefore, this
Reader will continue to focus on the development of
value chains and service markets.
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41 See for example “Harnessing Market Power for Rural Sanitation”. Water and Sanitation Program Field Note, World Bank / IDE,
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H. Other Measurement Issues
All of the previous Chapters focus on the
methodological challenges of measuring impacts;
the area is, however, multi-faceted, and there are
aspects of the process that cannot be addressed, for
example, only by hiring expert consultants. These
aspects are touched on below.
The time factor
116. Development practitioners are famously in a
hurry; they typically have ‘windows’ of 2-3 years in
which to prove both their programmes and
themselves. Yet many worthwhile changes probably
take longer than that; for example, it is estimated
that the adoption of ox-plough technology took
about 70 years, in the Machakos District of Kenya42.
Similarly, “it took nearly 100 years from the days of
Henry VII for Britain to catch up with the Low
Countries in woollen manufacturing.”43
117. At the other end of
the technology spectrum,
“it took Nokia 17 years to
earn any profit from its
electronics subsidiary,
which is now the biggest
mobile phone company in
the world”. Similarly, “it
took Toyota more than 30
years of protection and
subsidies to become
competitive in the
international car market,
even at the lower end of it.
It was a good 60 years
before it became one of the
world’s top car makers.”44
118. Another aspect of this dimension is that
effects may appear negative in the short term; for
example, enterprises may rationalise and shed
labour in the short term, in order to be more
competitive in the medium term. A programme
which had as its ultimate performance indicator the
number of jobs created would therefore appear to
have failed in the short term, even though the
remaining jobs (and future jobs to be created) may
be more secure and better paid.
119. The difference in timescales presents a major
challenge, particularly for practitioners who are
aiming to develop whole markets, systems and
economies. The concept of developing markets in a
systemic way is premised on greater impacts in the
long term, through sustainable change. Arguably,
the only way to ‘square the circle’ is to invest time in
projecting the anticipated impacts in the coming
years, well beyond the life of the programme.
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42 Mortimore, Michael, and Kate Wellard, January 1991. Environmental change and dryland management in Machakos District, Kenya,
1930-1990. ODI Working Paper no. 57, London.
43 Chang, Ha-Joon, 2007. Bad Samaritans: Rich Nations, Poor Policies and the Threat to the Developing World. Random House, London.
44 Op. Cit.
Human and Institutional
Factors
120. Development is implemented by people,
whose behaviour is moulded by incentives, abilities
and beliefs; these are, however, rarely considered in
discussions about the measurement of results. Gary
Woller, in a recent USAID discussion forum45 on this
subject, noted:
121. “There are indeed strong disincentives to
conduct impact assessments. There is the free rider
problem (‘why should I assess my program, let
so-and-so assess theirs?’), a public goods problem
(‘why should I invest my money in impact
assessment when others benefit from it, let
someone else invest in it’), a career problem (‘what
if I do an assessment and the results are not
favourable, how will that affect my career?’), a cost
problem (‘gee, impact assessment sure costs a lot,
better to save the money and channel it to program
beneficiaries’), and so forth.”
122. At a more personal level, people who are
good at getting results are often impatient with the
idea of rigorously measuring them. They think of
themselves as action-oriented, rather than as
statisticians; the inertia to carry out rigorous
measurement can be a function of personality as
much as anything else.
123. There is also the issue of organisational
structure, and the incentives that are implicit in that
structure. Paul Gertler of UC Berkeley, for example,
has noted that individual programme designers are
rarely also the implementers; indeed, many donors
forbid consultants responsible for programme
design from participating in the implementation.
Should the programme manager be penalised for
the poor results achieved by faithfully implementing
a poor programme design?
124. Sendhil Mullainathan of Harvard University
notes that often the agency task manager is
responsible overall for the design, implementation
and evaluation; this implies incentives to only
evaluate programmes with positive outcomes, or
those that the agency wants to stop. It also implies
possible penalties for innovation and
experimentation; in this perspective, the challenge is
not so much to do with evaluation methodologies,
but more about the way in which many agencies are
structured.
125. Indeed, more broadly, field-based staff of
many agencies wonder whether their HQ-based
colleagues really understand the local situation, with
all its complexity and challenges. Pressure from HQs
to measure performance can therefore be
interpreted as a way for senior managers to control
and steer field-based staff, in ways which would
only be acceptable if the methodology used was
also acceptable. There is, therefore, often
considerable resistance by field staff to measuring
results.
126. As an aside, development interventions are
universally based on the idea that there is ‘a
problem’, to which the intervention is intended to
be ‘the solution’. Within this framework, it is
difficult to consider opportunities taken or passed
up; this probably contributes to the ‘heaviness’ in
most programme evaluations, since creativity and
added value may not be much appreciated unless
they are clearly within the pre-determined
framework. This makes it more difficult for field
staff to perceive evaluations as potential learning
experiences.
127. Intended to be slightly humorous, the list on
the following page is often referred to by Danida’s
Evaluation Department; it illustrates nicely the
resistance often found at the field level to
evaluations.
128. If all of these objections can be overcome, the
funds can be found, and the evaluation put in
motion, the standard procedure in most agencies is
to hire an external consultant (or team of
consultants) to come in and conduct the evaluation.
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Standard Arguments to Avoid Evaluation
As part of our continuing efforts to facilitate the work of busy managers, we submit herewith a
selection of some of the most common responses to proposals that an evaluation be conducted.
Please note that none of these arguments will be accepted by the Evaluation Department.
1. Our project/programme is different.
2. It will cost too much.
3. We don’t have the time.
4. The project (activity) is too small.
5. It wasn’t in the implementation plan.
6. We’ve never done it before.
7. The government (institution) won’t like it.
8. Give me the money.
9. We don’t have the authority/responsibility.
10. There is no need for an evaluation.
11. It’s an ivory tower exercise.
12. Let’s get back to reality.
13. It’s not our problem.
14. Why change it; it’s working all right.
15. We’re not ready for it yet.
16. It isn’t in the budget.
17. The desk officer/TSA Advisor/Govt.
representative /CTA/Counterpart is new/
has recently been changed.
18. The desk officer/TSA Advisor/CTA/
Counterpart has left.
19. The Director/CTA/Counterpart has not yet
been appointed.
20. The counterpart staff is still in training/
on fellowships.
21. We/re doing all right without one.
22. It’s never been tried before.
23. There must be an ulterior motive.
24. Who’s trying to teach me my job?
25. That may work in any other organisation/
region/country/technical field but it will
never work here.
26. I’m not convinced it will help.
27. “They” just want to “get us”.
28. Think of the disruption it will cause.
29. It can’t be done objectively.
30. It’s too much trouble to change.
31. We’ve always done it this way.
32. We did what we said we’ll do.
33. We executed what was in the Programme
Document.
34. We have already been evaluated.
35. We don’t have any problems.
36. There’s been a change in the government.
37. The financial crisis put us behind schedule.
38. We were just audited.
39. The Ambassador says it’s one of his/her
best projects.
40. It’s a pilot project.
41. It’s a model project.
42. It’s an experimental project.
43. The project is too young.
44. The project is almost over.
45. Construction has not yet been completed.
46. The equipment has not yet arrived.
47. The equipment has not yet been installed.
48. Legal status has not yet been provided.
49. We can’t find the original workplan.
50. I wasn’t the responsible officer when the
project started.
51. The government is satisfied with the project.
52. The government hasn’t yet supplied the
inputs.
53. The project is not evaluable.
54. We don’t have the data.
55. The project design is too vague.
56. It’s a local holiday.
57. It’s the rainy season.
58. Let the Auditor General do it.
59. Outsiders won’t understand the complexities.
60. We evaluate all the time ourselves.
61. I’m due for home leave.
62. We are already planning the next phase.
63. Our colleagues in the SWAP won’t like it.
64. We are preparing a PCR.
While this has the advantage of probably being
somewhat impartial and objective, it often means
that the consultants have to learn rapidly about all
aspects of the programme.
129. Their Terms of Reference typically require
them to assess the programme against the original
project document and log-frame (if there was one) –
although sometimes the consultants are also asked
to assess the programme against current
understanding of best practice (which may have
changed substantially since the project document
was written).
130. In these circumstances, the consultants will
often conclude that, without baseline data, they
cannot provide a meaningful assessment of the
results. However, they may also feel that they need
to find significant shortcomings in the programme,
in order to justify their fee – again leading many
practitioners to dread any kind of evaluation.
131. A recent World Bank report on ‘How to Build
M&E Systems to Support Better Government’ 46 talks
of “carrots, sticks, and sermons. Many of these
incentives have been used to help institutionalise
M&E in developed and developing country
governments. Carrots provide positive
encouragement and rewards for conducting M&E
and utilizing the findings. They include, for example,
public recognition or financial incentives to
ministries that conduct M&E.
132. “Sticks include prods or penalties for
ministries or individual civil servants who fail to take
performance and M&E seriously—such as financial
penalties for ministries that fail to implement
agreed-on evaluation recommendations. Finally,
sermons include high-level statements of
endorsement and advocacy concerning the
importance of M&E. They also include efforts to
raise awareness of M&E and to explain to
government officials what’s in it for them.”
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I. The Benefits of
Approximate Measures
The previous Chapters have explored many of the
complexities and layers of the topic of measuring
results; it is time now to consider possible solutions,
and ways to avoid paralysis in the face of such
daunting challenges.
133. The most plausible conclusion of this
discussion is that ‘better is the enemy of good’; the
cost and effort to achieve rigour seem so daunting
that practitioners finally measure nothing. Sendhil
Mullainathan notes that all numbers created the
“illusion of precision”, whereas they are often highly
subjective – or are based on assumptions that are
subjective.
134. Subjective discussions are not in themselves a
problem, as long as people realise that it is possible
to have quantitative, subjective discussions that can
be approximately correct. For example, if the
approximate impact of one programme is
apparently 100 times the approximate impact of
another one, then it is probably better; such
differences are already apparent in some cases.
Simple calculations of the cost per person reached,
for example, might already permit the screening out
of some programme designs.
135. If given indicators could be measured in ways
that could be benchmarked and compared, this
would inevitably shape the incentives for, and
behaviour of, agency staff. Some argue that this
would encourage too narrow a focus on achieving
specific targets; since the world is so complex, this
would probably lead to counter-productive
responses.
136. Indeed, mainstream discussions tend to
include thoughts of a menu of indicators, from
which development practitioners can choose at will,
according to their circumstances and priorities.
While more theoretically sound, this approach
suffers from a number of disadvantages.
137. One is that it exposes agency staff to a long
list of objectives and priorities; some of these
overlap, but others may involve trade-offs. At
present, there is no way to choose between
objectives, with the result that programme choices
tend to be either based on personal preferences or
on perceived opportunities arising.
138. On the other hand, there would be three major
advantages to agreeing on what to measure, if that
agreement could be around a very small number of
indicators; no amount of qualitative or descriptive
evaluation will address any of these three
opportunities (and increasingly, urgent priorities):
Bulking Up Programme
Achievements Across the
Whole Agency
139. By using a few, comparable indicators,
development agencies could add together the
estimated impacts of all of their PSD interventions,
to give their managers some headline numbers
about the impacts they are achieving.
140. Parliaments in donor countries are
increasingly asking what their development
agencies have achieved recently – and are getting
‘headline’ answers that they can use, in the fields of
education and health. Indicators like numbers of
girls educated in school, and numbers of children
immunised, while essentially outputs, conjure up
images of pro-poor outcomes that parliamentarians
and voters can identify with.
141. The field of Private Sector Development
(PSD), meanwhile, is at best reporting on outputs
that do not particularly excite the electorate:
‘number of days to register a business’, or ‘increase
in sales’, do not necessarily paint a picture of poor
people finding new opportunities.
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142. The Paris Declaration stresses that the priorities
established by partner governments should dictate
what donors fund; one implication of this is that
every country programme is designed according to a
different logic; the ‘causal model’ is different, and in
practice, therefore, the indicators used are also
different – since there is no consensus at present in
the PSD community about what indicators to use.
143. Bilateral donors in particular tend to work on a
government-to-government basis, with country
programmes being shaped by dialogue and local
demand. This trend is amplified when each
programme is evaluated against the original
programme document (as in most agencies),
without much reference to any agency-wide
framework or set of indicators.
144. The IFC has been leading some of the thinking
in this area 47. It is already able to report, for example,
that its investments last year benefited 2.4m patients,
320,000 students, 12m power customers and 9m
water customers. It is also introducing a Development
Outcomes Tracking System (DOTS), anticipating that
it will guide future investments.
145. In Corporate Governance, for example, the
organisation is now tracking the number of legislative
acts adopted as a result of advisory services provided
(25 last year). Other data from 2006 include
investment enabled ($1,366m) and the leverage
achieved ($68 per dollar of funding for services) 48.
146. These numbers are particularly interesting, as
they enable the IFC to present its achievements in a
clear and brief format; on the other hand, they do
raise significant questions of attribution – particularly
in a world where joint programmes and inter-agency
collaboration are (hopefully) becoming more
common.
More Rational Funding
Choices
147. If there were agreement around a very few
indicators of impact, anticipated impacts could be
estimated ex-ante in ways that were comparable
across programmes. Funding agencies could then
ultimately make more rational funding choices
between different programmatic opportunities,
depending for example on local conditions.
Comparison Between
Programmes and Agencies
148. A more disruptive aspect of adopting a few
indicators on an inter-agency basis would be that
comparison between programmes and agencies
might then become possible. Michael Klein, for
example, currently the joint IFC-World Bank vice
president for PSD, has called for more competition
within the aid industry, based on the measurement
of results; others, though, have expressed concern
about the transaction cost of this approach49. Also,
this is likely to lead to competition for key local staff,
further weakening local government; “declines in
bureaucratic quality are associated with higher
donor fragmentation”50.
149. More importantly, the idea that results can be
measured and compared across agencies, countries
and time implies a mechanistic model: ‘given equal
conditions, the same inputs should lead to the same
results’. In practice, of course, no two sets of
conditions are equal; even if circumstances within a
given country could be controlled, it still operates in
a global business environment that is constantly
changing in very significant ways.
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50 Knack and Rahman, 2004. Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients. World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 3186, Washington DC. www.econ.nyu.edu/cvstarr/conferences/ForeignAid/papers/Knack.pdf
150. The idea that results can be compared is also
a function of the desire of most development
agencies to avoid risk; there is a constant search for
ways to reduce risk, and benchmarking of
performance will probably encourage that tendency;
a programme with a high chance of a modest
impact will generally be preferred, over a
programme with a modest chance of a very high
impact.
151. Indeed, PSD is rather more ambitious than
some other development interventions, in that it
aims to enhance an entire system (‘the private
sector’); it is therefore more complex, dynamic and
multi-dimensional than, for example, programmes to
increase distribution of vaccines. This does not,
however, absolve practitioners from demonstrating
results.
Early Adopters of Core
Indicators
152. TechnoServe is using 7 core indicators to
measure progress against programme forecasts and
goals internally; these indicators include measures
of business success, namely sales and net profits, as
well as indicators that proxy socio-economic impact
on the poor, namely value of purchases from rural
producers, number of producers, wages paid and
number of employees.
153. In addition, it carries out focused assessments
of projects from time to time, to triangulate on other
impact measures and to document important
anecdotal evidence of the broader socio-economic
impact of its work.
154. Interestingly, it also measures Return on
TechnoServe Investment (ROTI), which is the
incremental gross revenues generated by its SME
clients from project commencement to three years
after client engagement, divided by the full cost of
TechnoServe assistance. This gives a measure of
cost-effectiveness, to measure progress against
long-term objectives. In other words, it provides a
broad measure of whether the performance of the
organisation is improving, over time.
155. A major reason for choosing this indicator
was that it was likely to be auditable over time, in a
way that left a paper trail, and was replicable without
relying unduly on assumptions or local conditions.
In this context, it was felt that employment was too
difficult to measure in a way that was consistent and
reliable; issues such as seasonality and possible
child labour also posed methodological challenges.
156. Also, it was felt that increased revenues were
a more reliable proxy indicator of the total benefits
to the poor, since employment is only one channel
through which they would lead to benefits;
purchases from other businesses, taxes paid and
profits re-invested were also likely to be making
important contributions. While the measurements
will never be exact, they are likely to be
approximately right.
157. Attribution issues remain, and documenting
revenues is also challenging in many situations even
if TechnoServe often works with lead firms in value
chains, meaning that they do have records of some
kind. Nonetheless, market development effects
(such as spontaneous replication of innovations)
mean that tracking increases in revenues is a major
task in itself.
158. Indeed, and more generally, the potential for
comparison of performance highlights the
methodological pitfalls; if development
professionals are going to accept any kind of
ranking, they are clearly going to need to believe in
the methodology being used. Nonetheless,
Technoserve already find the ROTI indicator useful,
apparently, as part of the client/project selection
process (which must also include justification of
how the intervention will benefit the rural poor).
159. Importantly, the ROTI allows staff of
TechnoServe to orient and manage their efforts
around the organisation’s mission, which is to help
“entrepreneurial men and women in poor rural areas
of the developing world to build businesses that
create income, opportunity and economic growth for
their families, their communities and their countries”.
However, it is not yet used in any direct form as an
externally-published measure of achievement.
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160. Helvetas is also moving towards a uniform set
of key indicators for all their value chain projects,
starting with a measure of the change in farm
household income. This is currently focusing on the
increase in business incomes as a result of
interventions (as with Technoserve) and does not
yet make any estimate of displacement or
deadweight. The number of households reached is
also being measured, disaggregated by sex.
Ultimately, these measures will be related to total
project costs per farm household involved in the
chain.
161. Some practical examples of recent impact
assessments that are in the public domain are
explored in the following Chapters. There are others
that are not yet fully in the public domain, because
of concerns about rigour; indeed, all of the
measurements reported below imply a number of
methodological challenges.
162. Again, though, it is better to be approximately
right, than completely mysterious about outcomes;
in the absence of any reporting of results, critics and
sceptics will always say: “maybe you cannot
measure it because it isn’t there...” In that light,
therefore, any reporting of results will be an
improvement on the current situation,
notwithstanding the methodological challenges.
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J. Reporting on Scale
Approximate measures are therefore better than
no measures at all; what can be measured
approximately by most practitioners?
Where to make a start?
163. Development agencies are sensitive to the
suggestion that their interventions may be affecting
only a lucky few; meanwhile, millions remain in
poverty. Some programmes are therefore
considering above all how many people they are
reaching; for example, a donor-funded initiative to
support Uganda radio stations in launching
programmes for small business estimated that there
were 7 million listeners; the programmes were
reaching at least two thirds of the poorest members
of society51.
164. Similarly, the Rainforest Alliance52 (RA), a
US-based NGO, issues a seal of approval, which
“makes it easy for consumers to know they are
buying a product that has been
grown or made sustainably.
The companies who sell these
products also make sure their
customers know they are good
neighbours in their
communities, and that they take
care of their workers and
protect the environment.”
Specifically, RA reports the
following, rather impressive
outcomes53:
■ Forest Products: RA has
certified 3% of the working
forests (100m acres) in 50+
countries, working with IKEA,
Gibson USA, B&Q, Domtar,
Klabin, Tembec, Grupo
Nueva
■ Agriculture: RA has certified 1.3% of the world’s
coffee, and 15% of the world’s bananas; in total,
it has certified nearly 10,000 farms, growing
coffee, citrus, bananas, pineapple, cacao, flowers,
macadamia nuts, ferns, passion fruit, plantains, in
collaboration with Kraft, Chiquita, Caribou Coffee,
Whole Foods Markets
165. Following up on this, the targets that RA is
now setting are ambitious; for example, the
organisation is working with UNDP / GEF to certify
10% of the world’s coffee, to protect biodiversity on
coffee farms; similarly, it is collaborating with Kraft
to certify 100% of their sales under existing
trademarks in Western Europe and the US (12,000
tonnes in 2006, benefiting 27,000 families).
166. Similarly, the Shell Foundation says that its
“work is showing results:
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www.value-chains.org/dyn/valuechains/docs/381/RadioProgListeners9-04.pdf
52 www.rainforest-alliance.org
53 www.enterprise-development.org/resources/download.asp?id=412
■ 263,000 people in Mexico City travelling more
sustainably every day
■ $100m committed to small and medium sized
enterprises in Africa
■ 2,000 jobs created and 14,000 incomes improved
in India, Eastern Europe and Africa
■ 1 million women and children around the world
benefiting from cooking stoves that drastically
reduce health-damaging indoor smoke pollution.”
167. It also gives as its “vision for the next five
years:
■ 1,000,000 people travelling more sustainably
every day
■ $300m committed to small and medium sized
enterprises in Africa
■ 5,000 jobs created and 30,000 incomes improved
in India, Eastern Europe and Africa
■ 100 million people around the world benefiting
from cooking stoves that drastically reduce
health-damaging indoor smoke” 54
168. These indicators reflect a mixture of increased
inputs (“funds committed”) un-quantified impacts
(“more sustainably”, “incomes improved”), and
quantified impacts (“jobs created”). They paint a
picture of vigorous action – and importantly, they
point to a starting point for measurement, that most
practitioners can see as feasible. Even if they do not
measure much, almost anyone involved in a
programme can estimate how many people are
likely to be affected directly by it; intuitively, a
programme that reaches millions of people, even
superficially, is likely to be more interesting than one
that reaches just a few hundred, in depth.
169. Nonetheless, the extent of the scale reported
above, while a critical first step for impact
measurement, does not necessarily say much about
the changes that it made in people’s lives, nor does
it form the basis for a common measurement
system. The following Chapters outline some
assessments of actual impacts, in the development
of value chains and service markets.
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K. Impact Assessments for
Technical Assistance in
Value Chain Development
Several programmes have made serious efforts to
measure their achievements – and to relate them to the
cost of achieving them. Most of these have published
their findings only recently, and some are not yet even
published. The following Chapters summarise some of
the most interesting examples – particularly for those
aiming to up-grade whole market systems.
SEDF in Bangladesh
170. The IFC’s South Asia Enterprise Development
Facility (SEDF) has been working since 2003 in the
sectors of ready-made garments, light engineering
and agri-business – under its Sector Development
and Business Services (SDBS) programme. A major
element in the strategy was to engage directly with
market actors at the top of the value chain, where
possible; instruments included technical assistance
and cost-sharing for access to advisory services.
171. SEDF also aimed to address any constraint
that was more broadly limiting enterprise growth in
the chosen sectors, including for example
constraints around access to finance, and the
business environment. In addition, it considered
how competitive Bangladeshi industries could be in
global markets, when designing interventions55; the
Table below illustrates this, for the Ready-Made
Garments sector.
172. SDBS introduced a results-based performance
monitoring system, based on a logical framework
that linked activities to specific sector-level changes;
a customised management information system was
introduced as part of this. Action plans were linked
to the log-frame, and staff incentives were built in.
This system enabled staff to publish a review of the
results achieved56, which also provided much more
detail about the individual activities.
MEASURING AND REPORTING RESULTS
THE 2008 READER ON PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT34
P
h
o
to
:
C
h
a
rl
e
s
B
o
d
w
e
ll
Measure
SEDF
assisted
Bangladesh
baseline
Sri Lanka China Vietnam Cambodia Global
Labour turnover pa, % 11 15 6-8 6 7 7 5-6
Rejection rate, % 8 10 3 0.5 3 5 1
Plant availability, % 44 30 65 80 70 60 75
Labour cost, $/hour 0.37 0.30 0.46 0.50 0.30 0.40
ROI, % (knit) 18 15 18 25 20 18
Women as supervisors, % 1 0.5 40 70 60 65 40
55 http://www.value-chains.org/dyn/valuechains/docs/497/Adhikary_Monitoring.pdf
56 Adhikary and McVay, 2006. Market Development in Practice: Sector Development and Business Strategy. IFC SEDF, Dhaka.
www.value-chains.org/dyn/valuechains/bdssearch.details?p_phase_id=560&p_lang=en&p_phase_type_id=5
173. The review reported that “assisted clients
have generated 16,239 jobs, of which the majority
(65%) were for women. This includes 318 new
supervisory jobs for women. Based on a total
programme cost of $6.08m to date, these figures
represent a programme cost of $374 per job
generated by an assisted client. In total, assisted
firms employ 126,003 people, of whom 62% are
women.”
174. While these numbers represent, to some
extent, actual impacts, some of the donors
supporting this work chose in the Foreword to the
review to highlight instead that the programme “has
achieved a leverage ratio of around 1:19 times our
combined investment, a respectable figure given the
challenges of working in Bangladesh”. In this sense,
therefore, they chose a proxy that could be
measured with some accuracy, over a direct impact
where the accuracy could be called more into
question.
175. Either way, SEDF reports that it was able to
achieve good results, despite concerns about the
overall competitiveness of local industry, by
addressing a wide range of constraints to growth;
furthermore, it addressed them in a diverse and
flexible way. The results therefore serve to validate
the overall strategy, more than any one intervention
or input.
The Prosperity Initiative and
Bamboo in the Mekong
176. In 2006, a detailed feasibility study was carried
out by Oxfam Hong Kong, working with the IFC’s
Mekong Private Development Facility (MPDF); the
study benchmarked the potential of the bamboo
sector in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia against the
successful experience of China57. This study was
able to evaluate the pro-poor impact potential at a
regional scale, based on projections of future global
demand, and the competitiveness of the local
bamboo industry; it cost about $300,000.
177. The study found that pro-poor impacts could
be created at a regional scale if the three bamboo
sub-sectors could become efficient, and produce a
range of products that were competitive in a
growing global market. Each of the three
sub-sectors has a particular structure, with different
potentials to target poverty. Industrial bamboo
(flooring, furniture, charcoal, blinds, mats, panels,
chopsticks etc) has a high potential impact on
farmers, due to growing demand for raw material.
Handicrafts impact the labour market (women in
particular), and bamboo shoots again benefit
farmers – although in smaller numbers.
178. By looking across the three sub-sectors and
targeting a range of collaborative interventions in
the region, the project team estimated that a $40m
investment by donors into a coordinated strategy to
develop bamboo across Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia over the coming decade could generate
800,000 jobs at a cost of $50 per job. Through this, it
could lift 1million people out of poverty;
importantly, this approach is based on measurable
poverty impact goals, bottom-line indicators against
which the overall performance of the programme
could in principle be evaluated in future.
179. At the time of writing, PI (the new organisation
which has formed to take this work forward along
with IFC) was gearing up to implement the
programme on a multi-agency basis, as the Mekong
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Bamboo Consortium (MBC). Driven by the
knowledge and linkages generated in the sector
feasibility work, IFC and PI have been working with
businesses and partners to develop a demonstration
supply chain in Thanh Hoa province, Vietnam.
180. A range of activities have been developed, for
example in support of small factories that
dramatically reduce wastage of bamboo, by
pre-processing the culms close to the farms; these
factories have been established mostly by local,
small-scale investors. By late 2006, they were
employing more than 500 staff, 88% of whom came
from ethnic minorities, and 85% of whom were
women. Employees were earning $37.50 per month
on average, which compared well with the average
household income locally of about $17 pm.
181. The impacts on farmers as a result of the
increased efficiency have, however, been even more
significant. According to local authorities – and the
farmers and traders themselves – the emergence of
the pre-processing factories was pivotal in creating
the conditions for rapid expansion of demand for
bamboo. Specifically, between 2004 and 2006,
demand increased by 23%, and the price increased
by 32%. Farmers are now planting bamboo, and
moving out of less sustainable practices in the
mountainous areas. About 8,500 people of the
125,000 people who actually were directly benefiting
from income from the bamboo sector (4.8% of the
total population) were found to have moved out of
poverty in the previous 2 years. On the other hand,
of households without any bamboo income, over
3,000 people had fallen back into poverty.
182. In summary, bamboo was shown to be the
only economic sector positively correlated with
movement out of poverty; the 30% of the
population who were persisting with other sectors
and not making the change to bamboo were
slipping backwards into poverty. Plans to replicate
this type of experience are now being rolled out by
MBC and its partners in the region, using the clear
targets set using the feasibility analysis. There is
great potential for growth; costs of raw bamboo and
labour are still much lower in Vietnam than in China,
although the Chinese experience suggests that both
will rise substantially if the programme is successful
– with corresponding impacts on poverty.
Cluster Initiatives in
Sri Lanka
183. USAID in Sri Lanka commissioned an
assessment of its various cluster initiatives there, and
the summary report was published in 200358;
it subsequently achieved honourable mention in
USAID’s Impact Assessment Contest on building
credible impact information on PSD programmes59.
The programme included a portfolio of activities with
a wide range of sectors, such as rubber, precious
stones, ceramics, tourism, coir, spices and tea.
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59 http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=12529_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC
184. The assessment looked particularly at the
cost-benefit, calculating that the 8 activities selected
had a present value of net additional income of
$156m. Factoring in uncertainty and concerns about
deadweight, this was reduced to $69m. This was
apparently achieved at a cost of about $7m, giving a
benefit to cost ratio of about 10:1 (not taking into
account costs contributed by entrepreneurs
themselves – which would reduce the ratio to 8.6).
185. The author stresses that this is a conservative
estimate. Also, there was a large difference between
the performances of the different activities examined;
two generated income of more than $25m each,
while at the other end of the spectrum, one activity
had a negative yield. Although job creation was
mentioned explicitly in connection with the rubber
sector (“the programme will create jobs for 77,000
people”), it was not measured in this assessment.
186. The author concludes: “even though the
results reported here are reasonably good, there is
an astonishing paucity of data on the economic
impact of cluster initiatives. As a result, the cluster
approach has yet to meet the burden of proof as an
effective use of development assistance. To remedy
the lack of information and resolve the arguments
about the role of competitiveness projects, it is
essential to ensure that monitoring and evaluation of
the economic impact of cluster initiatives is part and
parcel of every competitiveness project”. This might
sound familiar to the reader.
Katalyst in Bangladesh
187. Katalyst60 is a multi-donor programme
working to develop value chains and service
markets in Bangladesh, through an extensive
portfolio of activities in many different sectors.
Between 2002 and 2007, the programme staff
calculate that they have generated at least 183,000
additional jobs (full-time equivalent), at a cost of
about $100 per job. The great majority of these jobs
will be for people living in poverty; half of the
Bangladeshi population currently lives below the
international poverty line.
188. Attribution has been estimated for each set of
activities individually: once impact has been
measured, it is reduced in line with staff estimates of
how much of that impact can reasonably be ‘claimed’
by Katalyst, rather than being a result – for example –
of investment by the private sector. This usually
involves reducing the measured impact by 60-90%, to
calculate the impacts reported above. The estimates
are therefore rather conservative, to take into account
the many other influences on the target group.
189. The calculation of impacts does include the
estimated effects of ‘crowding in’ of new entrants to
the sector (through a demonstration effect), and also
offsets estimated displacement effects. It does not
include possible indirect impacts, through the
forward and backward linkages stimulated by the
direct impacts. Increased maize output, for example,
is likely to stimulate more poultry production,
leading to increased employment also in that sector.
Although likely to be very substantial in some
sectors, these indirect impacts are not included, as
they proved too difficult to estimate with any
accuracy. In summary, the numbers are likely,
therefore, to be rather conservative.
190. As part of its portfolio of activities, Katalyst
has partnered with leading international suppliers of
agricultural inputs, to provide training to over 1,300
retailers supplying vegetable farmers with inputs.
The training enabled the retailers to give smallholder
farmers better advice on how to use inputs, such as
chemicals and seeds, more effectively. This would
be provided as an ‘embedded’ service – as part of
the sales transaction, rather than being paid for
separately. The causal model is illustrated below.
191. After one growing season, Katalyst surveyed
500 vegetable farmers. About half of the farmers
surveyed had been purchasing their inputs from
retailers who had taken the training; the other half
were purchasing their inputs elsewhere. The two
samples were selected at random, to the extent
possible.
192. The research found that farmers with larger
plots (over 1.5 acres) who were buying from trained
retailers were 50% more productive than those
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buying from other retailers, partly because they
were spending less on inputs. Earnings per acre
were also 58% higher. Farmers with very small
landholdings (less than 0.5 acres) who were buying
from trained retailers also performed better than
those who were not; while the differences were
statistically significant, they were however smaller
than for the larger farms – the profitability, for
example, was only 6% better.
193. Nonetheless, the programme had achieved
impressive scale; one year after training retailers,
about 239,000 vegetable farmers had benefited
directly from the improved advice. Katalyst also
looked at the market-wide effects, finding that
vegetable farmers who were not buying from trained
retailers were nonetheless copying the improved
practices of those who were buying from trained
retailers. Also, retailers who had not been trained
were beginning to copy those who had been.
194. As a result of these effects, about 246,000
vegetable farmers were likely to benefit indirectly
from the retailer training, within three years. This
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suggested a total outreach of about 485,000
vegetable farmers, at a cost to Katalyst of $100 per
retailer – suggesting a return on investment (extra
income to farmers / investment by Katalyst and
companies) of about 1:9 after three years (including
the indirect effects).
195. Further research is now needed, to
understand these findings better, as they raise a
number of questions. For example, were the farmers
buying from trained retailers already more
discerning? Questions of possible bias, related to
self-selection of the treatment groups, are very often
present in programmes that are developing whole
markets. And how will the retailers respond to the
implied loss of sales, as the larger farmers stop
buying inputs that they did not really need? Finally,
might further research reveal ways in which retailers
could target the smallest farms more effectively?
Water Pumps and Other
‘Appropriate Technologies’
196. ‘Appropriate technology’ (AT) interventions
are an example of a type of intervention that was
popular in the 1980s. It became clear, however, that
many of these projects were not adequately related
to market structures and local priorities; the devices
being worked on were either unaffordable or were
failing to address a critical need (or both). Over time,
however, a few AT interventions achieved scale of
outreach that was truly impressive61.
197. For example, KickStart (previously ApproTEC)
is feted as a cutting-edge example of social
entrepreneurship by the World Economic Forum,
Time Magazine, ABC, Deutsche Welle and the Wall
Street Journal. Furthermore, KickStart reports that
its work (particularly with treadle water pumps for
improving irrigation for smallholders) has led to the
creation of 50,000 new businesses, which generate
$52m per year in profits and wages – contributing
new revenues equivalent to 0.6% of Kenya’s GDP62.
This is the sort of very large scale impact that
development agencies dream of.
198. Attribution in such cases is relatively
straightforward, in the sense that the benefits can be
closely linked to the intervention; similarly,
deadweight and displacement are less problematic
than, for example, interventions like management
training (discussed below).
199. The success and recent recognition of KickStart
and others raises the question about how donor
support for different approaches grows and shrinks; it
may not be based only on the evidence available at the
time, or even later. In particular, do donors reward
proven performance, when it is finally demonstrated –
or are the negative experiences so traumatic and
institutionalised that they are reluctant to look back?
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L. Impact Assessments for
Management Training
Some reported impacts of management and
entrepreneurship training are included here, as they
are likely to be of particular interest to Seminar
participants, and to students of Readers in previous
years.
200. Measuring the impacts of management and
entrepreneurship training is notoriously difficult to
do, partly because of the many other events and
influences in the life of an entrepreneur. A small
piece of advice picked up in a training session may
ultimately make a huge difference to the business,
but the entrepreneur may forget completely that she
had picked it up in the training course. Nonetheless,
many attempts have been made to measure the
impacts, and some of the more interesting ones are
outlined below.
Management Training
in India
201. Malcolm Harper describes the evaluation of
the original achievement motivation training (AMT)
experiments in India63, in his book with Gerry
Finnegan entitled Value for Money?64 “This
evaluation calculated that the local training cost per
new job created in trainees’ businesses was Rs. 183
(or about $25 in 1968 when the experiments took
place), and that the trainees invested an average of
$100 of additional capital in their businesses for
every $5 of training cost.”
202. “A further study of a ‘Block Adoption
Programme’ in an Indian sub-district, carried out by
the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI),
showed that the average training cost per job
created was about Rs. 4,600 (or $150), and that it
resulted in average annual earnings per trainee of
Rs. 6,300 (or $210)(Acharya, 1990).” While these
numbers are interesting, it seems that no attempt
was made to look at market-wide impacts,
displacement etc.
Training of Peruvian
Micro-finance Clients
203. Researchers from Yale University65 carried out
a randomised control trial with women clients of
FINCA, a micro-finance institution (MFI) in Peru that
was also offering training to its clients in
management skills. “Treatment groups received
thirty to sixty minute entrepreneurship training
sessions during their normal weekly or monthly
banking meeting over a period of one to two years.
Control groups remained as they were before,
meeting at the same frequency but solely for making
loan and savings payments.”
204. Significant benefits were identified for the
MFI; repayment and client retention were both
found to have increased. Some benefits were also
identified among the clients:
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205. “Training participants demonstrated greater
business knowledge [and] the greater knowledge
translated into better business practices, though
only in limited areas. The training increased the
likelihood that individuals reinvested profits in their
business ..., maintained sales records for their
business ..., and maintained withdrawal records
from their business”. “The training has helped
clients identify strategies to reduce the fluctuations
in their sales.”
206. “Larger effects were found for those that
expressed less interest in training in a baseline
survey. This has important implications for
implementing similar market-based interventions
with a goal of recovering costs.” While the findings
were interesting in terms of their general trends, the
research was not sufficiently detailed or extensive to
be able to detect increases in employment over
time.
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M. Impact Assessments for
Challenge Funds, Matching
Grants and Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs)
Challenge funds, matching grants and PPPs are
discussed in some detail in this Chapter, since they
are outside the direct experience of many
practitioners working in the field of value chain
development. Nonetheless, they are popular with
bilateral donors, and some are quite large. They also
tend to focus on specific value chains.
207. Many donors operate schemes that essentially
make funds available to individual companies, in
order to stimulate investment and innovation; the
Canadian Council for Public Private Partnership
(www.pppcouncil.ca) offers the following definition
of PPPs: “a cooperative venture between the public
and private sectors, built on the expertise of each
partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs
through the appropriate allocation of resources,
risks and rewards.”
208. A Table summarising some of the larger
schemes is included on the following page66. Such
schemes are variously called challenge funds (DfID,
AusAID), matching grants (World Bank and others)
or Public Private Partnerships (GTZ); SDC prefers
the term Public Private Development Partnerships
(PPDPs) – to emphasise the developmental nature
and intentions of such partnerships. The unique
feature of such schemes is that the development
agency provides direct assistance to an individual
business, on the understanding that the interests of
the agency and the business coincide – or at least
overlap.
209. Often, such schemes encourage ‘lead’
companies to expand a value chain, or to diversify
into a new one, by contributing (often 50%) to the
cost of a pre-agreed activity. They therefore
complement the technical assistance provided by
many donor-funded initiatives, and the soft finance
provided by specialist agencies like FMO and DEG,
although the three approaches rarely work closely
together, in practice.
210. While some of these programmes mention
potential market-wide impacts of the individual
partnerships, there have not been major efforts to
try to stimulate such impacts. Also, none have yet
made efforts to measure spontaneous replications.
Anecdotally, the evidence is not clear; there are
occasionally replications that happen, but these can
seem almost accidental.
211. In such schemes, the ratio of operating or
management costs to the value of the grants
disbursed is widely considered as an important
indicator of efficiency. A review of 10 matching grant
schemes for the World Bank, for example, reported
that this ranged between 18% and 57%67.
212. Such reporting encourages the idea that
management costs are an ‘overhead’ to be
minimised; this also minimises the extent to which
programme managers can understand markets,
build relationships and provide forms of assistance
other than grants. Arguably, however, this is one
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attraction of such schemes: that they can ‘retail’
relatively large sums with relatively low overhead.
The idea that active management (and indeed
partnership) can deliver equivalent results – and
even be as cost-effective – needs to be
demonstrated, and preferably also quantified, even
if only approximately.
213. Another commonly-used measure with these
types of programmes is the leverage ratio – the ratio
of funds invested by the company to the funds
invested by the development agency. If this is high,
then the agency has been efficient in re-orienting
large amounts of private sector funding to achieve
its goals. In other words, the scale of what it has
been able to achieve with a given amount of public
funds has been substantially increased.
214. The issue of additionality (whether the grant
made something happen that would not otherwise
have happened) is discussed in some detail in “A
Micro-econometric Evaluation of the Mauritius
Technology Diffusion Scheme (TDS)”, by Tyler
Biggs for the World Bank in 199968. The conclusion is
that any such scheme needs to be able to show,
quantitatively and qualitatively, that the public funds
triggered events that would not otherwise have
happened; in Mauritius, this was not the case.
215. Given that the events did happen, it is also
important to relate the developmental impacts to the
public funds contributed, and the rest of this Chapter
is dedicated to that
question. If it could be
resolved, then the
leverage issue would be
factored in to the final
result, since the aim of
such measurements
would be to give an
estimate of the overall
effectiveness of the
application of public
funds.
Programme for Cooperation
with Emerging Markets
(PSOM), Netherlands
216. The Dutch Programme for Cooperation with
Emerging Markets (PSOM), for example, makes
funds available “to cost-share the initial financial
risks that [Dutch or LDC] companies face when
investing in the emerging markets of developing
countries. PSOM aims to finance pilot investment
projects that lead to follow-up commercial
investments and / or a lasting trade relation between
the Dutch and local companies.”69
217. It was decided to expand the scheme in 2001,
to a budget of 30m ($41m) p.a., on the
understanding that it was meeting explicitly
developmental goals (in addition to the commercial
ones of the participating companies): job creation,
involvement of local SMEs, transfer of knowledge
and concentration on poorer regions.
218. Indeed, a sophisticated tracking system was
introduced, to try to measure these variables for
every grant, and to move towards
performance-based contracts – in addition to
tracking the developmental impacts for five years
after the grant had finished70. In 2004, the budget
was further increased to 51m ($70m) p.a. The
average grant was about 825,000 ($1.1m); project
titles give some indication of the typical content, for
example:
■ Quality Management and Upgrading of the Thai
Horticultural Chain
■ Eco-Tech Pot-plant Propagation, Uganda
■ Production and Processing of Fresh Frozen
Vegetables, Indonesia
■ Bakery School, Mozambique
■ Organic production of Garlic, Sweet Corn and
Celery, South Africa
219. An independent evaluation of the results in
2005 found the following cost per direct job created:
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68 www.value-chains.org/dyn/valuechains/docs/165/BDStrainingTylerBiggs.pdf
69 PSOM Evaluation 2005: Final Synthesis Report. ECORYS-NEI for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (version March 2006).
70 The extent to which the scheme was tied to Dutch companies was reduced at the same time.
220. The number of jobs created indirectly in
agriculture was calculated by extrapolating from the
results of two projects, in Indonesia and Thailand,
that had contracted approximately 800 farmers
each. However, more information about the
classification of projects is not easily available, as
the design of each depends on the individual
circumstances and proposal. 71
221. The consultants concluded that the impacts
were increasing with time after completion of the
project, but did not have the data to quantify the
increases. Indeed, these numbers are only very
approximate, and do not take into account in a
systematic way issues of attribution / additionality,
displacement or deadweight. Also, the sample size
for most of the sectors was not large enough to be
able to deduce relative lessons about sectoral focus.
Nonetheless, the numbers were calculated by
external consultants, based on visits to 22
completed projects in the field, so do give some
interesting pointers.
DfID Challenge Funds
222. DfID’s Business Linkage Challenge Fund
(BLCF) committed a total of £16.6m ($33.4m72) to 58
projects, implying an average grant size of £270,000
($542,700). Again, the project titles give a clue as to
the sort of intervention envisaged, including for
example:
■ Fair Trade Horticulture in the Gambia
■ Pro-Poor Tourism in South Africa
■ Positioning Mozambique’s Fruit Industry in the
Global Market
■ Organic Herb Production Systems in Saint Lucia
■ Smallholder Essential Oil Production in Zambia
223. A subsequent desk analysis73 of the impacts
measured by the fund managers of the first six
rounds (£10.7m, or $21.5m committed) indicated the
following:
Direct jobs created / retained: 16,362
Number of skilled jobs created / retained: 3,146
Number of jobs created for women: 1,604
Number of skilled jobs created / retained
for women: 1,196
Estimated number of indirect jobs created: 90,316
Estimated total jobs created / retained: 106,678
224. These figures imply $1,300 per direct job
created or retained, and $200 per total jobs created
or retained. In 2006, AusAID took the analysis
further, dividing up the grants (and their reported
impacts) according to the business motivation, to
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Sector
No. of
projects
Cost per direct
job created,
US$71
Cost per total
jobs created,
US$
Agriculture / agri-business 16 10,700 2,740 – 4,110
Industry / manufacturing 2 12,500
Energy / environment 2 43,000
Transport / infrastructure 1 192,200
Tourism 1 62,100
Overall 22 12,600
71 at 1.00 = $1.37
72 £1 = $2.01
73 Kiggundu, Baker, undated, “The Business Linkages Challenge Fund as a Private Sector Development Instrument”. LSE Masters thesis.
www.businesslinkageschallengefund.org/components/download.aspx?id=1d2e4f44-2332-4e55-b9cf-759bc5204382
derive the numbers in the Table below. Note that
these figures are based on calculations by AusAID,
which were based on calculations by a Masters
candidate, which were based on telephone
interviews and other research by the BLCF
managers. Apparently, no more detailed impact
research was commissioned by DfID; as with PSOM,
additional caveats apply, in the sense that no
account has been taken of additionality,
displacement or deadweight.
225. Again, though, as relative numbers, they are
arguably sufficiently different to justify some reflection;
for example, it would seem that employment creation
or retention is relatively costly when creating new
markets for new products – particularly relative to
obtaining new inputs. This might be exaggerated in the
Table, in the sense that new products in new markets
may generate more employment in the long term;
these numbers were generated in the immediate
follow-up to grant implementation.
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Business motivation
No. of
grants
Ave. grant,
$
Ave.
direct jobs
created /
retained
Ave. est.
indirect
jobs
created
Total ave.
est. jobs
created /
retained
Cost per
direct job
created /
retained
Cost per
total jobs
created /
retained
Reduction in supply costs 6 506,000 147 82 229 3,442 2,210
Obtain previously
unobtainable resources
11 514,000 1,155 7,740 8,895 445 58
Create new markets for
existing products
5 762,000 52 647 699 14,654 1,090
Create new markets for
new products
3 1,000,000 22 167 189 45,455 5,291
Exchange rate £1.00 = US$ 2.01
N. Impact Assessments in Reform
of the Business Environment
Reform of the business environment has enjoyed
great donor attention in recent years; what do we
know about the impacts?
226. Many development practitioners believe that
excessive regulation (‘red tape’) is stifling enterprise
growth, and that cuts in this regulation would have a
very widespread impact, since they would benefit
many businesses. The Doing Business74 surveys of
the World Bank, for example, have attracted
widespread attention, by ranking countries
according to the amount of red tape, in various
areas of business operation. This has led many
agencies to focus on this area, and improvements
are being reported:
■ the time required to get a permit in one city in the
Philippines has been reduced from 17 days to 2
days75
■ Kenya was found to have over 1,300 business
licenses and fees imposed by 178 State bodies;
35 were eliminated in 2005. In the same year,
4,900 regulations were repealed in Ukraine76
■ a new Business Registration Law in Serbia
reduced registration time from 105 days to 5
days, and introduced a ‘silence is consent’ rule77
■ the number of days to obtain an operating
license in Lima was reduced from 60 to 1.678
■ a reform reduced registration time in Egypt from
366 days to 15 days79
■ in Peru, the title registration process has been
reduced from 7 years to 45 days, with the cost of
title coming down from $2,156 to $49. This has
led to 1.3m titles being registered between 1996
and 200280
227. Intuitively, these achievements seem likely to
help poor people to join the formal sector, and
therefore to have pro-poor impacts. However, these
impacts have not been measured in any detail, in
formats that have been made publicly available;
how many people have actually been lifted out of
poverty as a result of these reforms? Questions also
remain about how much regulation should be cut;
there is consensus, for example, that enterprises
should always conform with minimum labour
standards (so less regulation is not always
necessarily better than more regulation). The
discussion about how much regulation is
appropriate is still in progress.
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74 www.DoingBusiness.org
75 Keppel, Binh and Spatz, 2006. Streamlining Business Registration and Licensing Procedures: Experiences from the Philippines and
Vietnam. www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/117/Session1.1Paper1.1.1Keppel.pdf
76 Jacobs, Scott, 2006. The Regulatory Guillotine in Three Transition and Developing Countries.
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/81/Session4.2JacobsDoc.pdf
77 Vignjevic, Jasmina, 2005. Engaging the Private Sector in Business Environment Reforms: Experience from Southeast Europe.
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/76/Session2.4VignjevicDoc.pdf
78 Haggerty et al, 2005. Cutting Red Tape: Simplifying Regulation at the Municipal Level in Latin America.
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/81/Session4.2HaggartyDoc.pdf
79 Omran and Waly, 2005. Donors Business Environment Reform Interventions in Egypt.
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/75/Session2.3Omran-WaliDoc.pdf
80 Muir, Russell and Xiaofang Shen, 2005. Land Markets: Improving Access to Land and Buildings by Investors.
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/77/Session3.1Shen-MuirDoc.pdf
228. Nonetheless, advocates of cutting red tape
stress that countries with less red tape grow faster;
they have calculated that, if a country reformed its
regulations sufficiently to move from the bottom
quartile to the top one in the Doing Business
rankings, its growth rate could be expected to
increase by 2.2 percentage points81.
The causality of this assertion remains somewhat
open, however; the place of business environment
reform in value chain development also remains
rather unexplored, for the time being82, with many
agencies focusing instead on cutting red tape for all
kinds of business.
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81 Doing Business 2007, by Caralee McLiesh, 2006.
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/132/Day1PlenaryPresentationMcLiesh.pdf
82 Even though McKinseys’ Institute and others assert that perhaps a majority of critical business environment constraints are
sector-specific.
O. Summary of Results to Date
This Chapter provides some overview and final
observations about the various, specific impact
assessments reported in the previous Chapters.
229. Briefly, and as a further technical resume of
some of the information presented above, the
following Table summarises which aspects of
measurement are addressed most explicitly by each
of the studies outlined above.
230. The single indicator reported most often is
probably the Return on Investment – relating the
returns to the private sector resulting from the
original investment of development funds. This is
broadly similar to the private sector’s own Internal
Rate of Return (IRR): a tool for testing whether a
future investment meets the company’s minimum
standards, in terms of future profitability. One major
advantage of its application in this setting is that it is
broadly possible to measure both the size of the
investment and the additional revenues for (or costs
saved by) the target group as a result.
231. As a management tool, therefore, it has much
to commend it – as Technoserve and others have
noted. As a means of reporting impacts, however, it
is not very helpful, because it does not indicate who
has earned the returns – or what their pro-poor
impact is likely to be. For example, the main
beneficiaries might be very large companies, which
should not be expecting to profit at the tax-payers’
expense. But it may nonetheless be possible to
construct a case for the intervention, on the basis
that:
■ the company would not have made the change,
investment or innovation if the public funds had
not been contributed; and
■ the poor were benefiting very substantially (and
preferably quantifiably) through increased
markets for their produce or labour, improved
services, increased tax revenues to government,
etc.
232. If it were possible to relate the ‘returns’ on the
investment, for example through increased
employment and incomes, to numbers of people
lifted out of poverty, that would be enormously
helpful to donor agencies seeking to showcase their
achievements domestically. The tax-paying public
needs a clear picture of people emerging out of
poverty on a large scale, to continue to support such
investments.
233. Measurement of the ‘leverage’ has a similar
problem as IRR, in the sense that knowing the amount
of investment by the private sector, relative to the
amount invested by the public sector, tells us little
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SEDF Bangladesh x x
Prosperity Initiative,
Mekong
x x x x
Katalyst Bangladesh x x
Challenge Funds x x
about the
developmental impacts
of the total investment.
Indeed, although more
leverage is generally
implied to be better,
there are limits; if the
leverage is very high,
the observer may
question whether the
public funds contributed
made any difference,
either to the decision of the private sector to invest, or
to the developmental impacts of that investment.
234. Alternatively, the measurement of jobs created
may be more promising, since it is reasonable to
assume, at least in some cases, that the great
majority of the jobs created were for people who
were living around the poverty line. Further research
would be needed to quantify this assumption, and the
definition of a ‘job’ remains problematic; but such a
yardstick would be of particular interest to the
governments of developing countries.
235. The following Table summarises some of the
data presented earlier in the text, and includes a few
additional statistics from the first Donor Committee
conference on BDS83.
236. Clearly, the data presented above are relatively
crude – for example in the sense that they are not all
adjusted for 2007 values of the US dollar. The point is
that there are orders of magnitude in the differences
between the various numbers, so the relative values
are likely to be significant – even if the margin for
error is +/- 50%.
237. One exception to this may be in the multiplier
to be used in calculating the indirect impacts, since
this is much more difficult to define, even within a
given industry. Besides, the possible multipliers can
be large; Unilever Indonesia and Oxfam, for
example, concluded that there were about 300,000
FTE jobs in the value chain of Unilever Indonesia,
relative to the core workforce of about 5,000
people84 – suggesting a multiplier of about 60.
MEASURING AND REPORTING RESULTS
THE 2008 READER ON PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT50
Intervention Cost/job Notes
SEDF value chain development in Bangladesh 374
Mekong Bamboo Consortium 50 Projected
Katalyst value chain development in Bangladesh 100
Entrepreneurship training in India 25 1968 value
Entrepreneurship training in India 150 1990 value
PSOM matching grant PPP programme 2,700-4,100 All jobs (est.)
DFID Business Linkage Challenge Fund (n.b. jobs
created or retained)
1,300 Direct jobs only
200 All jobs (est.)
ApproTEC pumps etc. in Kenya 340 1998 value
K-MAP mentorship in Kenya 400 1998 estimate
AMKA marketing for SMEs in Tanzania 760 1998 estimate
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83 Tanburn, 1998. BDS: How sustainable can they really be? Report on the Harare Conference, October 1998. Committee of Donor
Agencies for SED/DFID/ILO. http://www.enterprise-development.org/events/event.asp?eventid=16
84 Clay, 2005. Exploring the Links Between International Business and Poverty Reduction: A Case Study of Unilever in Indonesia. Oxfam
GB, Novib, Unilever. http://www.cpi.cam.ac.uk/cms/pdf/unilever_indonesia_study.pdf
238. Similarly, Heineken85 estimated that there
were 6,780 people employed by suppliers, and
distributors and retailers of beer produced by Sierra
Leone Breweries, relative to 175 people employed
directly in the brewery – a multiplier of 39.
239. These numbers illustrate how sensitive the
overall calculation of jobs created is, to the multiplier
to be used; it would therefore be very helpful if a
neutral agency could determine appropriate
multipliers, and also provide some basic quality
control for numbers being generated by each
agency. This agency could also provide an
important way for individual agencies to limit the
political risk of adverse comparison, for example
through aggregating the outcomes across agencies.
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P. The Future
Pressures to measure and report on results are
increasing, as new players join the discussion. This
Reader aims to facilitate the process, leading to
more serious efforts in this field.
240. The measurement of results brings together
many different aspects of development; the
challenge is not just a technical one, but also has
political, institutional and human dimensions. These
are not often included in the debate, but do need to
be addressed.
241. In particular, there are trade-offs to be made –
for example between cost and rigour. Similarly, funds
spent in measuring and communicating results will
come from sources that otherwise might have been
used to achieve yet more results. As yet, there has not
been any in-depth discussion about these trade-offs,
and where lines should be drawn; however, such
discussion seems likely in the near future.
242. Pressure to report on results is growing; the
increasing profile of development aid in the minds of
the public, the approaching MDG deadline, and the
arrival of new types of development organisation, are
creating substantial pressures to paint a more
convincing picture of the results being achieved. These
results need to be communicated in ways that both
reflect some degree of rigour (or at least honesty), and
can be readily understood and appreciated by people
who have never worked in development.
243. Some would argue that, the more you
examine the issue of reporting on impacts, the more
complex it becomes. Defining and measuring
poverty, and establishing attribution, are just two of
the aspects that are multi-dimensional, and that
require a high level of expertise. But the tax-paying
public do not appreciate these complexities, and see
a lack of ‘headline numbers’ or sound-bites on
results as a possible indication that they don’t exist.
244. Practitioners are therefore in an
uncomfortable position, of wanting to report results
in ways that are convincing and credible, without
over-simplifying a complex situation. Development
agencies are often competing for funds, and there
are therefore few incentives to publish information
about results; either the results may appear to be
poor, or they may appear so good as not to be
credible. This has meant that practitioners would
rather keep silent, than talk about their achievements
in ways that are approximately right.
245. Beyond that, the lack of agreement around
what to measure, and how to measure it, means that
the observer has no way at present to tell whether
any particular intervention, agency or approach was
more or less effective than any other one (taking into
account context-specific factors, of course). So there
is no reasoned debate about which approach works
best in which circumstances; instead, there is a rush
from one paradigm to the next, often within the
space of 3-4 years.
246. This Reader argues that, in such a situation,
no-one gains – in particular, those living in poverty
who would gain the most from effective
development work must sometimes be bemused by
the shifts in focus that they may observe. Above all,
we owe it to them to work in a more intentional way
towards some form of measurement of results,
which would allow a more reasoned discussion, and
some element of comparison and benchmarking.
247. Reflecting the growing interest in the topic
generally, a consortium of donors is currently
launching an International Initiative for Impact
Evaluation (3IE); the consortium currently includes the
Governments of Mexico, Uganda, UK, Netherlands and
Canada, plus the African Development Bank and the
Hewlett and Gates Foundations. The institutional home
for this initiative has not yet been decided86.
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248. This type of initiative could provide the ‘home’
for standardising measurements that was referred to
in the previous Section; specifically, the most
important functions, which are needed on an
inter-agency basis, could include:
■ building agreement around key impact variables,
such as which indicators to measure (jobs?
people out of poverty?), and how to define them
in ways that are practical, yet linked to theoretical
models
■ validating proxies that could be used to measure
these key variables on an approximate basis, at
low cost
■ building agreement around which input costs
should be included in the calculations
(programme management? local contributions?)
■ defining minimum standards for approximate
measures of attribution, displacement,
deadweight etc.
■ research to generate reasonable multipliers, for
example in the case of the likely indirect impacts
upstream and downstream of the target group, in
selected sectors (similarly for impacts on the
local economy as a result of increased incomes,
taxes etc.)
■ development of additional, affordable
methodologies to measure ‘crowding in’,
‘copy-cats’ and other spontaneous replications
and market development effects that are the aim
of much PSD work
■ support to agencies to validate their own
approximate calculations, and to give them
greater credibility in the development community
■ where needed, support to agencies to make
comparative calculations more anonymous and
aggregated, to limit potential reputational risk
involved in being more transparent and open (at
least in the short term)
249. It seems unlikely that a generic initiative such
as 3IE can address the particular opportunities and
challenges involved in measuring the results
achieved in PSD. A more specialised initiative is
therefore probably required – similar, perhaps, to
the current work of CGAP in this area for
microfinance institutions.
250. One idea, proposed by Jim Tomecko during
the Chiang Mai Seminar, was the creation of a
system for certifying the quality of measurements
made. This would require the codification of ‘good
practice’ in measurement, and a cadre of evaluators
certified to sign off on the methodologies used;
such a system could reduce transaction costs for
programme managers, while giving donors and
others a degree of assurance that the numbers
being generated were credible.
251. Practitioners can contribute to this discussion,
now, by proposing and piloting ways to report on
their achievements, which allow observers to gain
some idea of how effective they are being, and how
impressive their achievements really are. Ultimately,
bilateral donors can probably contribute the most to
this debate, since they are not directly competing for
funds or constituencies, and can therefore share
their findings more openly.
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Annex A: New or Updated
Entries in the Last Year on
www.Value-Chains.org
(currently the same site as www.BDSKnowledge.org)
Note: For Readers unable to use the hyperlinks, using the Search function for the title should also work well.
Global Documents
■ Global Value Chains in the Agrifood Sector, IDS, UNIDO 2006 (entered 25 Aug 2007)
■ Upgrading in Global Value Chains, ILO 2004 (entered 25 Aug 2007)
■ Enhancing the Role of SMEs in Global Value Chains, OECD Conference June 07 (entered 25 Aug 2007)
■ The Future of Small Farms, IFPRI Conference 2005 (entered 20 Aug 2007)
■ GTZ Value Chains Conference, Berlin, May 2007 (entered 31 Jul 2007)
■ GTZ Conference: Local and Regional Economic Development in Asia, Vientiane, November 2006 (entered
30 Jun 2007)
■ Analyzing the Contribution of Business Services to European Economic Growth, 2007 (entered 30 Jun 2007)
■ Food Quality and Safety Standards – A Practitioners’ Reference Book, GTZ, 2007 (entered 13 Jun 2007,
last updated 25 Jun 2007)
■ Upgrading to Compete – Book from IADB 2006 (entered 4 Jun 2007)
■ Local Economic Development – Key Documents and Links (entered 14 May 2007)
■ Business Linkages: Lessons, Opportunities and Challenges, 2007 (entered 11 May 2007, last updated
8 Jun 2007)
■ Microfinance and BDS in Europe: A Guide to Good Practices, 2007 (entered 9 May 2007)
■ Market Development in Crisis-Affected Environments, SEEP MDWG 2007 (English/French)
(entered 5 May 2007, last updated 11 May 2007)
■ Poverty Reduction through Small Enterprises, ILO 2006 (entered 2 May 2007)
■ Eighth Annual Seminar on Developing Service Markets and Value Chains – Chiang Mai, 24-28 September
2007 (entered 17 Apr 2007, last updated 22 Aug 2007)
■ GTZ Value Chain Info Newsletter (entered 23 Mar 2007)
■ International Standards in Products, Production Methods and Services – Links and Key Documents, AGEG
2007 (entered 3 Mar 2007)
■ Linking Farmers to Markets, FAO, 2007 (entered 3 Mar 2007, last updated 25 May 2007)
■ Value Chain Development and Rural Employment: Round Table at the IFAD Governing Council, February
2007 (entered 27 Feb 2007, last updated 28 Feb 2007)
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■ First Regional Conference on Developing Service Markets and Value Chains, Jordan, February 2007
(English / Arabic) (entered 25 Feb 2007, last updated 19 Mar 2007)
■ Making Markets Work for the Poor in Eastern and Southern Africa, ComMark Seminar, 12-14 March 2007
(entered 27 Jan 2007, last updated 17 May 2007)
■ Shaping Value Chains for Development – Special Issue of the European Journal of Development Research,
2007 (entered 17 Jan 2007)
■ Services Inputs and Firm Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Firm-Level Data, World Bank,
2006 (entered 17 Jan 2007)
■ Donor Approaches to Supporting Pro-Poor Value Chains, Altenburg / Donor Committee, 2006
(entered 16 Jan 2007, last updated 2 Apr 2007)
■ Workshop: Making value chains work for the poor, SDC, 2007 (entered 14 Jan 2007, last updated 27 Apr 2007)
■ Lessons Learned on MSE Upgrading in Value Chains, ACDI/VOCA USAID AMAP 2007 (English/French)
(entered 8 Jan 2007, last updated 15 Aug 2007)
■ Investing in the Majority – SEEP Annual General Meeting 23-27 Oct, 2006 (entered 17 Dec 2006)
■ Private Sector Development in Post Conflict and Peace Building Situations – Some Key Links and
Documents (entered 7 Nov 2006, last updated 5 May 2007)
■ Second National Conference of the BDS Donor Coordination Group, Kenya 2006 (entered 21 Oct 2006,
last updated 18 Mar 2007)
■ Proceedings of the Frontis Workshop on Agro-food Chains and Networks for Development, Wageningen,
The Netherlands, 6-7 September 2004 (entered 13 Oct 2006)
■ ILO Guide for Value Chain Analysis and Upgrading, 2006 (English/French) (entered 11 Oct 2006,
last updated 28 Mar 2007)
■ Micro & Small Enterprises: Unexplored Pathways to Growth, IRIS 2006 (entered 6 Oct 2006,
last updated 13 Oct 2006)
■ MSEs, Dynamic Economic Growth, & Poverty Reduction: A Review of the Conceptual & Empirical Effects of
MSEs on Development , IRIS 06 (entered 6 Oct 2006)
■ Rural and Agricultural Finance, USAID Resources (entered 28 Mar 2006, last updated 20 Aug 2007)
■ Seventh Annual Seminar on Developing Service Markets and Value Chains – Chiang Mai,
18-22 September 2006 (English / French / Spanish) (entered 15 Mar 2006, last updated 2 Jun 2007)
■ Strategic Alliances for Financial Services and Market Linkages in Rural Areas, SEEP 2005-7
(entered 16 Dec 2005, last updated 17 Sep 2006)
■ Making Service Markets Work for the Poor: Some key links (entered 22 Nov 2005, last updated 20 Jul 2007)
■ Linking Small Firms to Competitive Strategies – USAID Breakfast Seminar Series 2005-7
(entered 15 Nov 2005, last updated 20 Aug 2007)
■ Calls for Papers / Participation (entered 11 Nov 2005, last updated 30 Jun 2007)
■ Value chains: Some key links (entered 9 Sep 2005, last updated 25 Aug 2007)
■ Les BDS: L’Actualité des services aux enterprises (entered 18 Feb 2005, last updated 30 Jun 2007)
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■ New opportunities related to value chains, service markets, MMW4P, etc. (entered 12 Aug 2004,
last updated 31 Jul 2007)
■ Top ten entries, in terms of visits in June 2007 (entered 21 Apr 2004, last updated 1 Jul 2007)
■ Top ten entries, in terms of total visits to date (1 July 2007) (entered 21 Apr 2004, last updated 1 Jul 2007)
■ Future events (entered 22 Dec 2003, last updated 23 Aug 2007)
■ Who profits from linking BDS to financial services? Sievers and Vandenberg, 2004 (entered 25 Sep 2003,
last updated 24 May 2007)
Market Assessment
■ Analyse de la filière Charbon de Bois au Sénégal, WRI 2006 (entered 20 Aug 2007, last updated
21 Aug 2007)
■ Philippines Processed Banana Value Chain Analysis, SDCAsia 2006 (entered 18 Jun 2007)
■ Artisanal Textiles value chain analysis, Senegal, 2006 (entered 18 May 2007, last updated 8 Jun 2007)
■ Hibiscus (bissap) value chain analysis, Senegal, 2006 (French) (entered 17 May 2007, last updated
8 May 2007)
■ Cashew value chain analysis, Senegal, 2006 (French) (entered 17 May 2007, last updated 18 May 2007)
■ Mango value chain analysis, Senegal, 2006 (French) (entered 17 May 2007, last updated 18 May 2007)
■ The Prosperity Initiative (research), 2007 (entered 5 May 2007, last updated 6 May 2007)
■ Analysis of the Integration of MSEs into Value Chains, Tanzania, USAID AMAP, 2006 (entered 5 May 2007)
■ Assessment of the Commercial Private Sector for Health Care Products in Bangladesh, AFE USAID 2006
(entered 5 May 2007)
■ Facilitating Market Integration of the Upland Poor into Bamboo Value Chains, Viet Nam M4P (ADB, DFID)
2006 (entered 25 Apr 2007)
■ Guide to Market Research for Agro-Processors, FAO 2003 English/Spanish (entered 22 Feb 2007,
last updated 3 Mar 2007)
■ Enterprise for Pro-Poor Growth Socio-Cultural Assessment, ILO, Sri Lanka 2006 (entered 7 Feb 2007)
■ Madagascar Aromatic and Medicinal Plant Value Chain Analysis, ACDI/VOCA, IRG, USAID AMAP 2006
(entered 19 Jan 2007)
■ Angola Enterprise Programme BDS Market Assessment, UNDP/Chevron/GoA, 2006 (entered 15 Dec 2006)
■ Haitian Handicraft Value Chain Analysis, USAID AMAP, 2006 (entered 23 Nov 2006, last updated
14 Dec 2006)
■ Rice Value Chains in Dien Bien Province Viet Nam, Agrifood Consulting, 2006 (entered 2 Nov 2006)
■ Northeast Thailand Rice Value Chain Study, Agrifood Consulting Int., 2005 (entered 2 Nov 2006)
■ Livestock sector study, USAID, Kenya, 2006 (entered 27 Oct 2006)
■ Feasibility study on production of wines and jams, Zambia, 2004 (entered 13 Oct 2006)
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■ Studies for indigenous fruit markets in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia, 2005 (entered 13 Oct 2006)
■ Feasibility study on production of indigenous fruit juice concentrate, Tanzania, 2004 (entered 13 Oct 2006)
■ Feasibility study on production of fruit juice concentrate, Malawi, 2004 (entered 13 Oct 2006)
■ Nature-Oriented Tourism in Ecuador: Applying the Value Chain and Nature, Wealth and Power Frameworks,
ACDI/VOCA. IRG, USAID (entered 6 Oct 2006)
■ Indonesia Cocoa Bean Value Chain Case Study, USAID AMAP, AFE 2006 (entered 6 Oct 2006)
■ The Participation of the Poor in Supermarkets and other Distribution Value Chains, Viet Nam, M4P, 2005
(entered 2 Oct 2006)
■ Mercy Corps, AED Assessment of the Hot Pepper Value Chain, Liberia, 2006 (entered 30 Sep 2006)
■ Value Chain Analysis with a Financial Services Lens, EDA, India 06 (entered 17 Sep 2006)
■ Participation of the Poor in the Tea Value Chain Vietnam, M4P (ADB, DFID) 2004 (entered 19 Jan 2006,
last updated 2 Nov 2006)
■ Value Chain Analysis (entered 16 Apr 2005, last updated 16 Aug 2007)
■ GTZ and Swisscontact Viet Nam – BDS Market Assessment 2001 (entered 2 Sep 2003, last updated
10 Mar 2007)
Project Design
■ Philippines Banana AgriChain Competitiveness Enhancement (B-ACE) Design, SDCAsia 2007
(entered 18 Jun 2007)
■ The Prosperity Initiative (design), 2007 (entered 5 May 2007, last updated 13 Jun 2007)
■ Financial Integration, Economic Strengthening & Broad-Based Dissemination (FIELD-Support), USAID
2006-10 (entered 5 May 2007)
■ AusAID Enterprise Challenge Fund for the Pacific and South-East Asia, 2006- (entered 3 Apr 2007,
last updated 4 Apr 2007)
■ Enterprise for Pro-Poor Growth, ILO, Sri Lanka 2005-8 (entered 31 Jan 2007, last updated 16 Apr 2007)
■ Agricultural Sector Program Support, Mozambique, DANIDA 2006 (entered 17 Sep 2006)
Implementation
■ Enterprise for Pro-Poor Growth Progress Reports, ILO, Sri Lanka 2005-8 (entered 6 Feb 2007, last updated
16 Apr 2007)
■ Market Development in Crisis-Affected Environments, SEEP AGM 2006 (entered 17 Dec 2006, last updated
1 Jan 2007)
■ Economic Support and Income Generation Programming for HIV and AIDS Impacted Communities, SEEP
AGM 2006 (entered 17 Dec 2006)
■ Bringing Knowledge to Vegetable Farmers, KATALYST Bangladesh 05 (entered 17 Sep 2006)
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■ KATALYST – Implementation, Bangladesh 2002-2007 (entered 17 Sep 2006)
■ The Thai German Programme for Enterprise Competitiveness, GTZ 2004-2012 (entered 16 Sep 2006,
last updated 16 Aug 2007)
■ Local Market Development, Helvetas/ICCO Kyrgyz Republic, 2006-7 (entered 28 Jun 2006, last updated
13 Apr 2007)
■ Philippines SME Development and Sustainable Employment Promotion – Tourism Sector, GTZ, GFA
(entered 11 Jun 2006, last updated 10 Jul 2007)
■ Making Markets Work Better for the Poor (Implementation), Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia (ADB, DFID)
2003-2007 (entered 17 May 2006, last updated 29 Mar 2007)
■ Public Private Partnerships (PPP), GTZ, Viet Nam, 2006 (entered 7 May 2006, last updated 1 Oct 2006)
■ Accelerating Shared Growth – Making Markets Work for the Poor in South Africa, ComMark 2006
(entered 5 May 2006, last updated 26 Dec 2006)
■ Access to Contemporary Markets for Homebound Women Embroiderers in Pakistan, MEDA, ECDI
2003-2007 (entered 13 Nov 2005, last updated 9 Feb 2007)
■ Kenya BDS Implementation, USAID / Emerging Markets Group, 2004-8 (entered 1 Mar 2004, last updated
31 Jul 2007)
Impact Assessment
■ Common Monitoring System for Proyectos de Integracion Productiva, IADB 2005 English/Spanish
(entered 23 Aug 2007)
■ ADB Evaluation Methods and Guidelines (entered 30 Jun 2007)
■ IFC Results Measurement Events, 2007 (entered 29 Mar 2007, last updated 17 May 2007)
■ Enterprise for Pro-Poor Growth Baseline Reports, ILO, Sri Lanka 2006 (entered 2 Feb 2007)
■ Private Sector Development Impact Assessment Primer Series, USAID AMAP (entered 22 Jan 2007,
last updated 11 Apr 2007)
■ The Economic Impact of Cluster Initiatives under the Competitiveness Initiative Project, USAID 2003
(entered 2 Jan 2007)
■ Assessing the Impact of the Micro and Small Enterprise Trade-led Growth Project of USAID/BRAZIL 2004-6
(entered 23 Nov 2006)
■ Impact Assessment On-line Discussion, USAID microLINKS.org, Sept 06 (entered 14 Nov 2006)
■ PROFIT Zambia Impact Assessment Baseline Research Design, USAID, DAI, 2006 English/French
(entered 2 Nov 2006, last updated 27 Nov 2006)
■ The Thai German Programme for Enterprise Competitiveness – Impact, GTZ 2005-6 (entered 16 Sep 2006,
last updated 13 Oct 2006)
■ Listener Survey, MSE Radio Programmes in Uganda, 2004 (entered 29 Jan 2005, last updated 20 Jul 2007)
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Final Documentation
■ Making Markets Work for the Poor: Case Studies for SDC, 2007 (entered 9 Jul 2007, last updated
10 Jul 2007)
■ Local/Regional Economic Development in South-Eastern Europe, GTZ 2006 (entered 5 Jun 2007)
■ Handmade Paper in Nepal, GTZ 2007 (entered 21 May 2007, last updated 22 May 2007)
■ The Experience of IFC/SEDF with Sector Development and Business Service Strategy in Bangladesh, 2006
(entered 27 Nov 2006)
■ RESTART – Help for Tsunami Impacted SMEs, GTZ, Thailand 05 (entered 12 Sep 2006)
■ Exploring the Links between International Business and Poverty Reduction: Unilever in Indonesia, 2005
(entered 20 Dec 2005, last updated 20 Jan 2007)
■ Value Chains and BDS Development: Linking Communities to Mainstream Markets in Mindanao, SDCAsia,
2002-6 (entered 18 Jan 2005, last updated 12 Jun 2007)
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